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Abstract
This dissertation presents three articles that study crises from a sociological perspective. The first two
articles studies the effects of global trade networks on financial and political crises with the implantation
of big data and supervised machine learning methods on a dataset for a sample of 70 countries for the
years between 1962 and 2009. Using the institutional and network theories, the first article finds support
that normative pressures lead countries to commit sovereign defaults. Countries are more likely to
commit sovereign default if other structurally equivalent or role equivalent countries did so in the previous
year. The second article finds that role equivalent and structurally equivalent countries occupying a
similar position in the global trade networks are affected similarly by revolutionary waves and experience
revolutionary situations simultaneously. The third article argues that state secularization is a process
involving mobilization, political tactics, and resources as opposing forces struggle over three major
institutional dimensions. Examining the history of state secularization in Turkey, Mexico, and France in the
aftermath of revolutions, this article demonstrates that the degree of secularization is determined by
political contention. (1) The revolutionary state attempts to seize church property, which opens the way
for further struggles. (2) If the church administers law through its own courts, or has an autonomous
code of law, revolutionary states struggle to substitute secular courts and state-enacted law. (3) Churches
often control education; a revolutionary state eventually attempts to take control of education when it
mobilizes sufficient resources for the required state capacity. Taking all these dimensions together, the
struggle over secularization has many partial outcomes and stopping places, and thus mixed patterns are
much more typical than an ideal type transition to pure secularist modernity.
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ABSTRACT

BEFORE AND AFTER THE GREAT CONTENTIONS: EXPLAINING THE
DIFFUSION OF CRISES WITH MACHINE LEARNING AND ARCHIVES
Doğa Kerestecioğlu
Mauro F. Guillén
This dissertation presents three articles that study crises from a
sociological perspective. The first two articles studies the effects of global trade
networks on financial and political crises with the implantation of big data and
supervised machine learning methods on a dataset for a sample of 70 countries
for the years between 1962 and 2009. Using the institutional and network
theories, the first article finds support that normative pressures lead countries to
commit sovereign defaults. Countries are more likely to commit sovereign default
if other structurally equivalent or role equivalent countries did so in the previous
year. The second article finds that role equivalent and structurally equivalent
countries occupying a similar position in the global trade networks are affected
similarly by revolutionary waves and experience revolutionary situations
simultaneously. The third article argues that state secularization is a process
involving mobilization, political tactics, and resources as opposing forces struggle
over three major institutional dimensions. Examining the history of state
xiii

secularization in Turkey, Mexico, and France in the aftermath of revolutions, this
article demonstrates that the degree of secularization is determined by political
contention. (1) The revolutionary state attempts to seize church property, which
opens the way for further struggles. (2) If the church administers law through its
own courts, or has an autonomous code of law, revolutionary states struggle to
substitute secular courts and state-enacted law. (3) Churches often control
education; a revolutionary state eventually attempts to take control of education
when it mobilizes sufficient resources for the required state capacity. Taking all
these dimensions together, the struggle over secularization has many partial
outcomes and stopping places, and thus mixed patterns are much more typical
than an ideal type transition to pure secularist modernity.
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PREFACE
1. Crisis and Sociology
This dissertation presents three articles that focus on understudied issues
regarding crises in the sociological literature. Crises by definition are rare, but
they are key and frequent events that punctuate processes of state building,
episodes of international conflict, and other macro trends. Sociologists have been
studying crises in one form or another ever since the inception of the field. In its
earliest days a specific form of crises, revolution, has received close attention.
This was mostly due to the fact that when sociology was coined as a social
science, it happened in a period of history that was heavily affected by the French
Revolution and its aftermath. The dominant paradigm of the Enlightenment at
the time had a path-dependent effect on how revolutions and crises in sociology
came to be studied over the last century or so.
Affected by this positivist paradigm of their period, theories presented by
Marx and Engels assumed that the existence of natural laws applied to not only
hard science such as physics, chemistry, and biology, but also for the social
sciences. This supposition lead them to argue that revolutions play a significant
role in the societies as marking the point in time when the societies move from
one specific stage to another.
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Despite the changing paradigms and dominant theories in sociology over
the centuries, this special status conferred upon revolutions has persisted mostly
unchanged. Revolution has been one of the most common topics in the field of
historical and comparative sociology, which consistently built upon a coherent
literature on revolutions. The evolution of theories in the field over decades has
been well documented (Goldstone 1980, Goodwin 1994).
An interesting and striking fact about these theories is that until recently
revolutions were perceived as special and significant, unique events. While recent
generations of revolution theories allow for discussion over types of revolutions
and whether certain events qualify as a revolution or not, the general assumption
in the field is that revolutions are a specific type of social phenomenon that has
its own unique causes and dynamics. This is mainly due to the path-dependent
evolution of the theories starting from the Marxian notion that revolutions are
supposed to have a transformational effect, progressing societies from a certain
stage to the next one.
As such, historically, most attention has been paid to causes and the
periods leading to the revolutions, rather than its aftermath. This also led to
successful revolutions being used as a unit of analysis, instead of crises, which
covers a greater spectrum of events under the definition of the term1. This trend
was recently identified by both in the subfield of revolutions and in other related
subfields that deal with different types of contention in societies. There have been
xxi

calls for focusing research on the aftermaths of revolutions (Goldstone 2001).
There have also been calls for studying revolutions along with other dynamics of
contention such as conflict, social movements, etc. with the notion that all these
varying types of contention might be affected by the same dynamics (McAdam,
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).
This dissertation recognizes the dearth in research pointed out by these
calls and presents three articles that informs on these issues by focusing on the
conditions leading to crises, and the patterns that happen in their aftermath. By
using quantitative methods such as machine learning and statistical modeling,
the first two articles focus on two different forms of crises and study how they
diffuse globally. These methods allow for the study of a larger number of cases
and observations from big data to scrutinize crises as the dependent variable.
Studying crises, in place of revolutions, allow for learning from not only a limited
number of successful cases matched to similar failed ones, but from a
comprehensive systematic comparison of all potential cases. The third article
presents a study on the aftermath of revolutions, the severest form of crises, to
identify patterns that lead to stability.
2. Global Diffusion of Crises
The commonly preferred methodology in theories of revolution is
comparative historical methods that favor in-depth case studies and qualitative
methods that are occasionally also supported by demographic or statistical
xxii

models. These approaches allow the researchers to gather highly detailed
information regarding the processes that underlie revolutions and compare them
to other potential cases that had different outcomes. While these approaches are
extremely useful for explaining the causal mechanisms that lead to revolutions,
the number of cases they can study are limited. In practice, researchers are
required to study thousands of historical documents in multiple languages and
analyze them in depth before they can implement a systematic comparison to
discover these patterns. These methods are highly fitting for the original
questions of the literature that are interested in studying specific great
revolutions in the history. Skocpol (1979)’s classic work studying the social
revolutions in France, Russia, and China is a typical example of this, as the
author’s main interest is explaining social revolutions and the author finds the
three cases to be the most fitting examples of these phenomena in history.
When the goal is to only explain a handful of cases in history, historical
and comparative methods are the most fitting ones; however, when the subject is
approached from a dynamics of contention perspective, where the goal is to
discover common dynamics that underlie various types of conflict, the limited
number of cases allowed by the qualitative methods become less satisfactory. The
number of contentions that take place decreases as the severity of the contention
increases. Contentious cases with lower severity, such as demonstrations or riots,
take place much more commonly than high severity cases, like revolutions or
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rebellions. As there are thousands of these low severity cases compared to the
high severity ones, studying them using historical and comparative methods is
problematic during the process of case selection. While selecting ideal type cases
for revolutions might be possible due to their rarity, it is harder to select an ideal
type case that is exemplary of all demonstrations or riots. It is even more difficult
to select failed cases to which to compare.
For example, a common finding in theories of revolution is that
international strains play a significant role in leading to state breakdowns.
Traditionally these strains are studied from a bilateral perspective and
researchers mostly pay attention to the greatest of these strains such as
international warfare. Yet, international strains are not only limited international
warfare, nor do these strains solely result from relationships in which the focal
country engages.
To remedy this problem, this article opts for using big data and supervised
and unsupervised machine learning techniques to account for the great number
of variables potentially having effects. If the dynamics of contention are similar in
cases of varying severity, one should observe similar conditions affecting the
outcomes. In other words, different types of contention should be affected by
similar variables. Two of the articles presented in this dissertation focuses on two
different but highly severe types of crises: external sovereign defaults and
revolutionary situations.
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External sovereign defaults, as frequently evidenced in literature, is closely
related to the willingness of the states to pay their debt and happens when they
are no longer willing to honor their previous agreements. This key concept of
willingness to pay, which determines whether states commit an external
sovereign default or not, qualifies sovereign defaults as a case of contention. The
parties involved in the crises, debtor country and lenders, engage in political
contention over the terms of a potential default or restructuring of the debt.
Meanwhile, the debtor country risking bankruptcy also faces political contention
locally with its subjects, who will be affected greatly by the outcome. As such,
economic crises are neither solely economic nor financial events. Instead, they
should be studied as contentious events that are affected by similar dynamics as
other types of contentious events.
Revolutionary situations, similar to successful revolutions, are contentious
events with the highest severity. There will be special conditions for when these
revolutionary situations will end up as successful cases, which are studied in
depth by the existing literature, but there are fewer studies that try to discover
common strains that lead to all potential revolutionary situations. If the school of
thought introduced by dynamics of contention is valid, then one should expect
similar dynamics to affect both successful and failed cases of revolutions,
regardless of their outcome.
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A systematic comparison of dynamics that has a significant effect on both
sovereign defaults and revolutionary situations is not immediately apparent or
intuitive. This is, where recent technological developments in data collection and
analysis come to aid. This dissertation favors the use of graph theory, methods
developed by social networks theory, and big data to develop a comprehensive
study that discovers the common variables that serve as significant dynamics of
contention.
An in-depth review of the existing literature focusing on these two
different types of contention reveals that there is ample evidence that patterns of
trade have a significant role. Both articles presented in this dissertation use big
data, methods suggested by graph theory, and social networks analysis to build
measures that can test the effects of trade ties on these crises. The results in both
articles demonstrate that similar dynamics of trade play a significant role in
leading to the two different types of crises and leads credence to the approach
suggested by dynamics of contention.
3. Why Big Data?
Advances in technology and innovations in data collection and storage
have lead to an immense amount of data accumulation that did not exist in prior
stages of human history. In our present day, more data is available to researchers
than there ever was. As of the writing date of this dissertation, there is an
apprehension towards big data in the field of sociology2; however, as evidenced
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by the articles in this dissertation with a solid theoretical foundation, big data can
be a powerful tool in sociological research.
As sociologists, for decades we have focused on the motivations and
actions of individuals. Big data—whether it is provided through technological
companies such as Twitter or Facebook, or international organizations such as
United Nations—and advanced computers allow researchers to study millions of
observations at once and control for all the variables that might be affecting a
phenomenon. One big advantage of the existing big data that is presently
available to researchers is the fact that it reports on the actions that individuals
have taken, instead of motivations that they claim. Data coming from a tweet, an
individual posts on the internet, or trade data reported by United Nations is not
an opinion claimed or a memory recalled, but actual action that was carried out
by the subject in study. This presents itself as a great strength over survey results,
where the researchers have to deal with various problems of recall and cognition
that lead to reliability and validity errors.
The biggest problem that arrives with big data is the sheer size of the data
that the researcher has to deal with. Social sciences and their quantitative
methods have developed over the years to deal with the scarcity of data and
dealing with small datasets. Once the researchers no longer deal with small
samples of larger populations, the p-values that they tend to rely on and accept
become less meaningful. Mathematically, as the sizes of the samples increase, the
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p-values decrease. The researchers need to be aware of this fact and not simply
rely on small values derived from millions of observations; however, this should
not mean that they should simply ignore the new resources available to them.
The articles in this dissertation use ensemble methods to deal with this
problem. Motivated by the literature, I collected highly granular data on the trade
behavior for a sample of 70 countries. Based on data that was reported by United
Nations on types of products countries have imported and exported, I have
gathered data on approximately 30 million3 observations over 47 years. I also
gathered data on bilateral trade between countries as reported by the Correlates
of War Project.
While it is not possible to implement a systematic comparison of so many
observations using historical and comparative methods nor is it reliable to
conduct causal inference using statistical methods over such a large amount of
observations, I have used methods derived from graph theory and social
networks methods to implement dimensionality reduction. To put things into
perspective in relation to the problem of limited number of cases a researcher can
systematically study when using qualitative methods, the number of bilateral
trade relationships between the countries reported for my sample between the
years 1962 and 2009 is 108,590. It is not humanly possible to keep track of so
many relationships from a qualitative perspective.
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The methods derived from graph theory and social networks analysis
allowed me to make systematic analyses of all of these relationships along with
accounting for other variables. I came up with measures that consider how the
position of one country has changed in comparison to others in the world society
across years when these millions of relationships across the world were held into
account. It is significant that both articles in this dissertation find that the
measures that were derived using the same big data and machine learning
methods had similar effects on two different types of contention that were
previously assumed to be of different causes. In fact, these two types of crises are
traditionally studied by two different disciplines of social sciences. On one hand,
categorized as a type of financial crises, sovereign defaults are commonly seen as
a subject covered by research in the field of economics. On the other hand,
revolutionary situations are categorized as either political or sociological
phenomena and are commonly studied by sociologists and political scientists. As
these dissertation reveals, even crises that are solely seen to be derived by
economic factors should be studied from a sociological perspective and
sociological variables should be taken into account in their explanations.
4. The Aftermath of Revolutions
The final article in this dissertation pays attention to the aftermath of
crises, which was recognized as an understudied issue in a recent call in the
literature mentioned above. Motivated by the finding that crises tend to diffuse
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around countries with similar types of culture, it studies three cases that had a
similar type of outcome following revolutions.
Because of the exploratory nature of the question posed by the literature, I
have opted for an in-depth study of three historical cases using comparative and
historical methods. This study reveals that there is a pattern to postrevolutionary state formation when the challenger groups find themselves facing
against an incumbent political group that are mainly legitimated through a
religious authority. Studying the cases of France, Mexico, and Turkey in the
aftermath of revolutions, I observe that the methods of post-revolutionaries
implemented by the French in their earlier experiences diffuse into the later cases
of Mexico and Turkey.
The article identifies the major dimensions of political struggles that have
a determining effect on the degree of secularism a state will have in the aftermath
of a revolution. As the political crises resulting from struggles between modern
states and religious authorities are still an ongoing problem in our present day,
the findings regarding the underlying patterns for what results in a ‘settled time’
following a revolution is valuable for understanding current cases as well.
5. Dissertation Plan
The first article in the dissertation studies the effects of global trade
network structure on sovereign defaults. It finds that countries that are
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structurally equivalent in the global trade networks are more likely to commit
sovereign defaults during the same waves of financial crises in historical time
periods.
The following article studies the effects of global trade network structure
on revolutionary situations. Similar to the first article, it finds that structurally
equivalent and role equivalent countries are likely to be affected during the same
revolutionary waves. While these two articles are motivated by relevant
literatures studying their specific phenomenon, they use similar statistical and
machine learning methods that rely on big data and quantitative analyses. This is
a significant point, which not only reveals that different subfields of sociology
have valuable contributions for each other, but also strengthens the point made
by dynamics of contention literature: different types of contention are likely to be
affected by similar strains.
The third article is an in-depth study of aftermath of crises and presents a
theory of secularizing revolutions by analyzing the cases of France, Mexico, and
Turkey. It reveals a pattern that secularization happens through struggles across
religious property, civic rights, law, and education. The final chapter concludes
the dissertation with a summary of conclusions and potential avenues for future
research with lessons based on these three articles.
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Another possible reason for the dearth of studies on the aftermath of revolutions also has to do
with the positivistic roots of these theories. Because revolutions are perceived to be
transformational events that progresses societies from one stage to another, there is a rarely
voiced implicit assumption that revolutions bring positive outcomes. When the periods following
the revolutions are studied; however, it is soon realized that there is a great diversion between the
intentions of revolutionaries and the acts of post-revolutionaries. This can be problematic for
theories when the social revolutions that are carried out by the support of masses and peasant
classes end up as new forms of state that do not necessarily favor the masses.
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The latest issue of Perspectives, the official newsletter of the American Sociological Association’s
Theory Section was devoted to the topic of “Big Data,” which surveyed leading scholars from
various subfields of sociology to provide their opinions on the topic. The editor of the issue
summarizes these scholars’ views as “from celebratory and optimistic to wary and cautioning.”
This summary is barely a euphemism for most of the scholars’ apprehension towards big data.
One of the scholars describe big data as “the new fad in social sciences…” Most scholars do not
give much credence to this “fad” of big data. The general consensus is that big data is unlikely to
be of any use without concrete theories. Interestingly enough, the scholars, who approach big data
most positively are those working on comparative historical and social movements fields.
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The size of the raw data I gathered from Feenstra et al’s dataset had 27,573,764 observations.
The observations related to the sample I used were around 3.3 M observations. After wrangling
the data and pre-processing, the measures I built were done by using around 400 k observations.
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ARTICLE 1: EXPLANING FINANCIAL CRISES THROUGH GLOBAL
TRADE NETWORKS: THE INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE OF
SOVEREIGN DEBT DEFAULTS AND SOVEREIGN STATES’
WILLINGNESS TO PAY1
1. Abstract
In sovereign bankruptcies, willingness to pay plays a more significant role than in
the case of individual or corporate bankruptcies. This results in sociological
processes taking place at a global level affecting the decisions of individual
countries when they face financial hardships. How countries identify themselves
among others, and how they are identified by the world society, affects their
default behavior. Trade is one of the most important relationships that countries
constantly and frequently engaged in, and as such they can be used for
determining countries positions in the global space. Using the institutional and
network theories, this article uses unsupervised machine learning to process big
data reporting on volumes of products traded to implement dimensionality
reduction to analyze millions of observations on traded products. Based on a
dataset of 70 countries reporting on social, political, and economic features for
the years between 1962 to 2009, I find support that normative pressures lead
countries to commit sovereign defaults. Countries are more likely to commit
sovereign default other structurally equivalent or role equivalent countries did so
in the previous year.

1

1

This article is co-authored with Mauro F. Guillen

2. Introduction
In the market economy, crises are as old as the existence of the capitalist
system itself (Arrighi [1994] 2010). The sociological literature sees economic
crises as a necessary condition for social and political change, especially social
revolutions (Skocpol 1979; Goldstone 1993). They also play an important role in
determining the hegemonic structure of the world-system (Wallerstein [1974]
2011; Arrighi 2010).
In recent decades, most crises—especially financial ones—occurred in
emerging economies. The global financial crisis of 2008; however, represents a
stark reminder that no economy is immune from the market system running
amok. Even after the U.S. economy has (partially) recovered from the crisis, as
late as 2013, there was a non-zero-probability risk of default due to the stalemate
in Congress, resulting in a downgrading of U.S. government debt by the credit
rating agencies, although a U.S. default would be purely “technical1.”
This idiosyncratic event in the U.S. financial history is just a particularly
striking example of a more general finding. Financial crises are driven not just by
economic fundamentals but also by social and political processes at the state and
global levels (Carruthers and Kim 2011). One specific type of financial debacle
that tends to play an especially important role in state building and in
international conflicts is the sovereign debt crisis and default. The extraction
power by states and the ability to raise revenue play an important role in
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determining the state’s capacity to engage in policymaking (Centeno 1997; Tilly
[1990] 1992).
This article focuses on social-structural processes at the global level that
affect the financial capacity of states. We develop arguments about how the
interconnections between pairs of countries affect the propensity of a country
declaring itself in default. In economic and financial analyses of default, state
actors are assumed to be rational decision makers with the ability to assess
macroeconomic fundamentals and act accordingly. The macroeconomic variables
entertained in these analyses include fiscal deficit, inflation, GDP growth, and
exchange rate overvaluation, among flow variables, and debt-to GDP ratio and
short-term debt among stock variables. Economic and financial perspectives
provide a baseline argument for sovereign defaults arguing that they happen
when states lose the ability to service their debts. This has motivated researchdeveloping measures of solvency, liquidity, deficits, and volatility to predict their
effects on sovereign defaults (Detragiache and Spilimbergo 2001; Hemming, Kell,
and Shimmelpfenning 2005; Catão and Sutton 2002). While there is a wide
agreement that economic indicators are significant, there is debate on whether
political variables are significant or not. Existing research has shown that
political uncertainty leads to economic uncertainty (Manasse, Roubini, and
Schimmelpfenning 2003), and democracy plays a significant role in external
sovereign defaults (Verma 2002), but others find that “political events and
3

variables do not add any additional information once economic factors have been
accounted for” (Haque 1998, 12).
These perspectives, however, either downplay or ignore the social
processes that take place at a more global-structural level. The socially
constructed nature of global finance is frequently neglected in market approaches
(Carruthers 2011; Biggart 1991). In order to account for these shortcomings more
recent research identified willingness-to-pay to have a central role in declaring
sovereign defaults (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Even if there might not be welldefined procedures against a sovereign default from the creditors, the indirect
costs are still significant enough to deter states from reverting to defaults as the
first best option. In fact it is the existence of these indirect costs that allow for the
existence of sovereign debt. Had such indirect costs not existed, the states would
simply default in every given opportunity. Willingness-to-pay is explained
through countries making decisions based on their perceived costs of defaulting,
including loss of autonomy, tarnishing of national prestige, and international
ostracism. Assuming an anarchic space with no overseeing authority, Tomz
(2007) argues that reputational costs allow sovereign lending and stresses that
context matters in decision to default. He argues that the defaults of the Russia,
Mexico, and Ecuador happened “when external conditions did not justify a lapse”
(228), and thus they were not allowed to borrow for the rest of the decade.
Borensztein and Panizza have identified three additional categories of costs that
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also play a significant role in decision-making process before committing
defaults. These include “international trade exclusion costs, costs to the domestic
economy through the financial system, and political costs to the authorities”
(Borensztein and Panizza 2009, 5).
Despite the acknowledgment of the importance of willingness-to-pay by
this line of research, assumptions of an anarchic global space and atomized
decision making are not satisfactory from a sociological perspective. The
willingness to pay is usually associated with the internal traits of countries, such
as credit culture and stability of the political system (Tomz and Wright 2013).
Yet, defaults do not take place in isolation, as one empirically observes a
clustering of defaults over time (see Figure I). The peak years in terms of defaults
are 1828, 1876, 1932, and 1983. In other words, sovereign defaults occur in
waves, with several states getting into trouble simultaneously. It seems that once
a country defaults, others tend to follow suit, as in the Latin American debt crisis
of 1982, and the East Asian flu crisis of 1996. Economists explain this clustering
by reference to business cycles, where credit booms typically result in sovereign
defaults (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2006).

5

Figure I - External Defaults Since 1800

Sociological research shows that institutional and cognitive processes
(Carruthers 2011; Swedberg 2011), organizational structures and regulation
(Guillén and Suarez 2011; Palmer and Maher 2011), and historical processes
(Fligstein and Goldstein 2011; Dobbin 1994; Mizruchi 2011) play significant roles
in economic crises. Changes in organizational structure, regulation, and political
context may lead actors to readjust their considerations for short-term effects,
which might lead to crisis-prone situations in the long run (Krippner 2011). The
common conclusion underlying the sociological literature is the embeddedness of
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the actors, whether they are individuals, organizations, or political entities,
within a social network, where they are affected by their ties. However, many
studies mostly focus on the US due to its role as a financial leader. Both this
common finding and the trajectory of the global crisis, which first began as a
mortgage crisis in the US but then diffused to other countries, and mutated to
become a sovereign debt crisis in Europe reveals that finance, or more
specifically, sovereign debt is not an issue specific to single countries but it is a
matter embedded in the global finance system. Existing research within countries
can be improved by transnational research that considers not only one country
but also the connectedness of the global economy.
In this article, we improve upon the existing literature by testing measures
of interconnectedness and reveal the significant effects that relationships
between countries have on sovereign defaults. We develop two hypotheses based
on two dominant global-level theories, world polity and world-system. We argue
that learning and similarity in behavior happens among states that trade more
with each other instead of having a diffused pattern of trade spread evenly across
all countries. We also find that states occupying a similar position in the global
trade structure will experience crises at similar points in time.
3. The Ambiguities of Sovereign Defaults in A Global Economy
Bankruptcy is one of the foundational elements of the market economy
because it provides an exit mechanism for individuals, companies and entire
7

countries. Sovereign defaults are a foundational and important element of the
global economic system. They have been a part of the global economy since the
existence of modern nation-states. The first modern nation-states also happened
to be the first serial defaulters. England, the Italian city-states, France, and
Portugal were all defaulted repeatedly before the 1800s, i.e. until they could
establish stable national economies and strong institutions (Reinhart and Rogoff
2009). Defaults became more common after industrialization. This happened
due to two reasons. First, more modern nation-states became established in the
global political arena. It is only after a modern nation-state establishes a national
economy that it can have the capacity to carry out substantive amounts of
borrowing. Without a large borrowing capacity, states cannot incur sufficient
sovereign debts to default. Second, the creation of markets for public debt
increased both the size and depth of financial markets. Markets for public debt
increased potential capacity for sovereign debt incurred by states, which
increased the potential for borrowing beyond capacity, leading to sovereign
defaults.
Public debt continues to be a core element in the present global economy.
However, public debt is different from private debt. For private agents, lending
and borrowing are routine activities. When investments do not pay off as
planned, bankruptcy is a regular outcome for underperforming firms; when firms
fail, there are clear guidelines about how lenders can take action using the state
8

as a mediator. Creditors can make claims on the assets of the bankrupt debtor
and retrieve some (if not all) of their loss. However, the process changes when the
bankrupt agent is a sovereign state. While it may have been tried in the past,
gunboat diplomacy is too costly for states to coerce other states into paying their
debts. Moreover, at the present time declaring war over another state due to
economic failures is no longer legitimate. There is no single international
overseer legal agency to facilitate the default of a sovereign. Most states’ assets
cannot be appropriated when states default on their debt because such assets are
usually immune and off limits. The claims of creditors are not well defined and it
is unlikely for judges to rule against their own state (Yeyati 2005; Borensztein
and Panizza 2009). Bankrupt states do not go out of business, either. States
continue to exist in their sovereign capacity. They might default on some of their
debt instead of going completely bankrupt. In other cases, when facing the
default of a debtor, lenders might choose to pre-emptively bail them out to
prevent greater overall costs. While defaults have been common in the global
economy throughout the history, the legitimate ways to resolve them has varied
across different time periods.
This creates an ambiguous situation in terms of power between lenders
and borrowers. While lender states and other parties are powerful due to their
economic capacity, debtor states can also become powerful as lender states
become dependent on collecting the debt. In the case of sovereign defaults, the
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issue becomes even more complicated given Borensztein and Panizza’s (2009)
conclusion that the economic effects of sovereign defaults tend to be short-lived,
and usually do not extend beyond two years. The dependency increases with the
amount of debt. Focusing solely on the countries that participate in lending and
borrowing from each other is not sufficient to understand the entire mechanism
underlying sovereign lending. In order to get a complete picture of the sovereign
lending system, one should also account for the global-level mechanisms that
play an underlying role in the bilateral relationships. Sociologists have long
demonstrated that cultural construction of nation states play a role in
determining legitimate behavior, which effects decision making (Meyer 2010),
and global trade patterns play a significant role in how power is distributed
among countries that occupy different spaces in the world system (Wallerstein
[1974] 2011; Arrighi [1994] 2010).
Institutional processes can play a significant role in determining the
behavior of states as they participate in a common world polity and strive for
legitimacy independent of their efficiency (Meyer and Rowan 1977). This results
in mimetic processes among states, where they replicate each other’s behavior.
The behavior of other states that is deemed legitimate is replicated. As states have
become globally more connected, they have structurally expanded around the
globe. This process has legitimated the world models helping in the consolidation
of a world society. In this new world society, the states’ responsibilities have
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increased compared to earlier eras (Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1997; Meyer 2010).
While they have been required as necessary actors to make and enforce rules,
they have also been expected to remain legitimate within the world polity and
society. While the expansion of world society has resulted in increasing
convergence, the result is not increasing flattening of the world polity. Instead,
the world polity becomes more fragmented and regionalized (Beckfield 2010). In
other words, the perception of legitimacy across the world society is not flat but
instead may vary across different states based on their varied connections with
each other.
In a global system in which countries interact with one another, they start
to influence each other’s actions, resulting in the formation of a collective culture.
Let us build the argument about cohesion from the group level to the
organizational field, and then to the world-polity and world-system level. High
social density translates into social cohesion, which in turn tends to produce
behavioral similarity (Durkheim [1915] 1995; Durkheim [1933] 1997; Collins
1994). Actors in social networks who share strong connections to one another
tend to develop strong group identity, solidarity and conformity. Cohesive
networks establish “sacred objects”, i.e. symbols of focused attention that
demarcate the boundaries of the group. Similarity in behavior is driven by the
actors’ desire to appear appropriate and legitimate within their shared social
context.
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At the level of the organizational field, Harrison White was the first to
conceptualize the argument in his sociology of markets. He defines markets as
social structures arising among cliques of firms watching one another as they
position themselves in distinct market niches (White 1981, 2002). The
organizations in the field or market observe and benchmark against other
organizations or actors they consider to be their peers (Strang and Tuma 1993).
As the number of organizations in the same field that adopt a given innovation,
structure or practice grows; the behavior becomes legitimized (Abrahamson and
Rosenkopf 1993).
The argument about social cohesion and behavioral similarity can be
extended to states in the world-polity and world-system (Guler et al. 2002; Polillo
and Guillen 2005). When two states have intense relationships with one another,
they are more likely to adopt common patterns of behavior. In particular, the
intensity of trade transactions indicates the density of the social network in which
a given country is embedded. To use Durkheim’s terminology, defaulting on
sovereign debt is conferred with the “sacredness” of group membership. Our
argument is that countries that exhibit cohesive trade relationships with each
other are likely to adopt similar patterns of behavior, including the decision to
default. Sovereign debt crises involve high level of uncertainty; precisely the
situation in which neo-institutional theory predicts that isomorphic behavior
driven by social norms will emerge (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). When one state
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commits sovereign default, it sets a precedent for others who consider it as a peer
and have an intense relationship with it. In particular, seeing one country go into
default in a socially cohesive environment prompts others in the same context to
ask for similar terms of treatment.
Examples of this pattern abound. In times of high violent conflict,
countries might stop servicing their debt, as it happened in the cases of AustriaHungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey before World War I, and Italy, Japan, and Turkey
before World War II. Cohesiveness also takes place among lenders, which
typically result in formation of associations or institutions that can facilitate
harmonized behavior among them. In late 19th and early 20th centuries creditors
lending countries formed their own local associations to take united action
among debtors. In England, the British Corporation of Foreign Bondholders
(CFB) was the major creditor association that acted on behalf of lenders to
resolve issues of default. Similar institutions were also set up in, France, Belgium,
Switzerland, Germany, and the United States. In late 20th Century “Bank
Advisory Committee” (BAC) assumed a similar role. Such institutions result in
cohesive action from creditors and result in similar treatments deemed to be
legitimate by the world polity to countries perceived to be in similar situations in
a given time period. For example in the late 19th Century and early 20th Centuries,
creditors could form administrative units that would assume the public financial
management of the defaulting countries (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2006). In
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other time periods, countries might be bailed out before they an actual default,
such as the IMF bailouts of Thailand and South Korea in 1997. Given these
arguments and historical evidence, we expect that
Hypothesis 1: Controlling for macroeconomic and politicaleconomic variables, the more a state trades with another state that
declares sovereign default, the more it is likely to declare sovereign
default.
Intense relationships between pairs of countries are one mechanism
underpinning behavioral similarity. The other key effect identified in the
literature is structural equivalence. Burt (1987) proposed that individuals and
organizations occupying the same position in social structure are likely to behave
similarly. He considered two actors to be in the same position if they are
structurally equivalent, i.e. they each have the same set of relationships with third
actors.
Applying the concept of structural equivalence at the global level runs
parallel to the tenets of world-system and world-polity theories. Countries in the
world-system occupy different structural positions, namely, some are
industrialized core countries and others are peripheral providers of natural
resources and cheap labor (Wallerstein [1974] 2011). The development of
industry in the periphery led to the concept of “semi-periphery,” that is, newlyindustrialized countries that are still dependent on core countries for technology
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and markets (Guillén 2001). In the world-polity, some countries are more
frequently sources of cultural models than others, which tend to be recipients
(Meyer et al. 1997).
We argue that countries embedded in the same structural position in trade
networks are more likely to exhibit similar behavior because they face similar
opportunities and threats. Common relationships puts countries in a situation in
which they share the same sources of supply and destination markets, even if
they do not trade with one another, i.e. if their dyadic cohesion is low. Financial
markets, and especially sovereign debt markets, tend to see structurally
equivalent countries as similar. In particular, research has shown that crises
often occur in waves affecting different parts of the world, in a pattern that
reveals an underlying structure of positional equivalence (Reinhart and Rogoff
2009). For instance, the Asian flu crisis of 1997 spread from Thailand like
wildfire to other East and South East Asian economies, all of which used local
labor to make manufactured goods for export to the U.S. and European markets.
The economies in that part of the world were structurally equivalent, and many
were driven to situations of near default. We therefore predict that:
Hypothesis 2: Controlling for macroeconomic and politicaleconomic variables, the more a pair of countries trades with the same
third countries, the more likely a default in one of them will be
followed by a default in the other.
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4. Data
We have gathered panel data for 70 countries across six continents for the
years between 1962 and 2009. The sample was mainly based on Reinhart and
Rogoff’s (2009) compendium and subsequent online updates, from which our
dependent variables were collected2. The sample is representative of the world
economy, as it includes both developed and developing economies accounting for
approximately 95% of global GDP. The sample includes countries with different
default behavior in the period studied. Not all countries experienced a default or
near default in this period. Some of these countries have graduated after previous
experiences; others have never experienced defaults in their history. It should
also be noted that the panels are not balanced, as the time period we study
includes two major time periods when the geopolitical landscape changed. The
late 1960s experienced the wave of decolonization and the late 80s witnessed the
fall of USSR. In both time periods new countries declared independence. Some of
these countries are included in our sample, and they are left-censored for all the
years before their independence. We also treat the Federal Republic of Germany
before unification as a separate group from Germany so the former is rightcensored after unification and the latter is left-censored before unification.
5. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in our analysis is external sovereign defaults.
Different financial agencies use varying criteria for categorizing events as a
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sovereign default (Borensztein and Panizza 2009). For the purposes of this
paper, we use Reinhart and Rogoff’s definition, which states that
...[A] sovereign default is the failure of a government
to meet a principal or interest payment on the due
date (or within the grace period). These episodes
include instances in which rescheduled debt is
ultimately extinguished in terms less favorable than
the original obligation (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009,
11).
According to this definition, defaults cannot occur in two consecutive
years. If a state declares sovereign default, a further default in the next year is
considered as a part of the same sovereign default; however, a second sovereign
default is possible two years after the first default. Due to this definition of
sovereign defaults, there are no cases where multiple events occur in a year.
Sovereign defaults are coded as a binary variable valued as 1 when the country
declares sovereign default in a given year and as 0 in all other cases. The dataset
also includes six cases of “near” defaults for hypothetical cases of defaults, which
were effectively prevented by IMF interventions3. Because our hypothesis about
trade cohesion considers cohesive behavior among both creditors and debtors, we
have also created a second variable that includes cases of near default as if they
were cases of default.
6. Explanatory Variables
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World systems theories argue that trade networks play an important role
in the global social structure and one can understand the world order by
analyzing these structures (Chase-Dunn 1999; Arrighi 1999). Previous work has
shown that trade network measures have significant effects in the diffusion of
institutional standards and behaviors across sovereign states (Guler, Guillén, and
Macpherson 2002; Henisz, Zelner, and Guillén 2005; Polillo and Guillén 2005;
Weber, Davis, and Lounsbury 2009). Following this line of work, we calculated
trade cohesion in trade and structural equivalence in trade measures regarding
sovereign defaults. The trade cohesion effect in sovereign defaults measure is the
explanatory variable we use for testing Hypothesis 1. Building the trade cohesion
measure requires both data on bilateral trade between countries and data on the
total trade of a country for each year. We gathered these data from the Correlates
of War (COW) Project Trade Data Set4. Based on our two dependent variables, we
built two measures on trade cohesion in trade. First we created a separate
symmetric bilateral trade matrix of all the countries for each year in our sample.
Next, absent ties in bilateral trade data were coded as 0 values in these matrices.
As Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009) explain, imputation of missing bilateral
trade values is problematic. Moreover, as they explain, sometimes trade data is
purposefully misreported by states. Since our theory is interested in social
perceptions of the world society, treating non-existing information as 0 is fitting
because lack of reporting is also a signal. These trade matrices were used for
building both trade cohesion measures. We created two separate vectors external
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sovereign defaults. In order to account for the time it might take for the cohesion
processes to settle we consider a three-year period for countries having a trade
cohesion effect. The first group of vectors (ESDjt) was coded as 1 if country j has
declared default at any time between t and t-3. Otherwise they were coded as 0.
The second group of vectors (ESNDjt) was coded as 1 if country j has declared
default or experienced a “near” default situation at any time between t and t-3.
Following the method used by Polillo and Guillén (2005) we have constructed a
trade cohesion measure for country i at time t as the following:
(a) For external sovereign defaults only:
Trade Cohesion Effectit =

!"#$%!"#
! 𝐸𝑆𝐷!" × !"#$%
!"

÷ 1000

(b) For external sovereign defaults and “near” defaults:
Trade Cohesion Effectit =

!"#$%!"#
! 𝐸𝑆𝑁𝐷!" × !"#$%
!"

÷ 1000

Where Tradeijt is the total trade (sum of imports and exports) between
country i and country j in year t, and Tradeit is the total trade country i carried
out with all other countries in year t. The measure is the sum of a focal country’s
cohesion scores with its defaulting trading partners in a given year. The score
increases when i and j are stronger trade partners and j is a country that defaults
in year t and it further increases if i has more strong partners with defaults in a
given year. In other words, the trade cohesion measure captures the strength of
trade ties between a focal state and a state that defaults on its debt. Higher
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scoring states will share a high proportion of their total trade with states that
declare sovereign default in a given year. States that have no trade ties with a
defaulting state in a given year will receive 0 as their score that year. The score is
divided by 1000 for scaling purposes. According to H1, we expect trade cohesion
to have a significant positive effect on the dependent variable.
To test hypothesis 2, we constructed a structural equivalence measure that
accounts for occupying similar positions in the trade network. Using the same
data from COW Trade Dataset, we calculated the correlation of trade partners for
all the countries in the network per given year. We then multiplied the correlation
matrix by ESDjt and ESNDjt vectors for the given year two create the two
structural equivalence scores:
(a) For external sovereign defaults only:
Structural equivalence in trade effectit =

! 𝐸𝑆𝐷!" ×

𝑟(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!" , 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!" )

(b) For external sovereign defaults and “near” defaults:
Structural equivalence in trade effectit =

! 𝐸𝑆𝑁𝐷!" ×

𝑟(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!" , 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!" )

This score increases if the focal state’s volume of trade with partners have
a high correlation with defaulting states’ volume of trade partners in a given year.
In other words, states that trade with the same partners in similar volumes get
higher scores. This score is not bounded and can also be negative if the
correlations between the types of products between two countries are negative.
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According to hypothesis 2, we expect structural equivalence in trade to have a
significant positive effect on sovereign defaults.
7. Control Variables
Table I lists the descriptive statistics of the control variables we included
along with the explanatory variables. To test the effects of democracy, we used
Polity IV dataset’s polity variable, which is an index of autocracy and democracy
that ranges between values -10 and 10, where more democratic states get higher
values and more autocratic states get lower negative values5. Other control
variables were collected from World Development Indicators dataset from World
Bank6. We use gross domestic product per capita and terms of trade to control for
the economic development of the country. Both of these variables are taken from
WDI.
Table I - Sample Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Sovereign External Defaults

0.029

0.168

0

1

Sovereign External Defaults and “Near” Defaults

0.031

0.174

0

1

Cohesion in Trade for Defaults

0.467

5.372

0

108.194

Cohesion in Trade for Defaults and “Near”
Defaults

0.467

5.372

0

108.194

Structural Equivalence in Trade for Defaults

3.84

3.283

-0.142

17.611

Structural Equivalence in Trade for Defaults and
“Near” Defaults

3.84

3.283

-0.142

17.611

Polity2

3.57

7.02

-9

10

GDP Growth (Annual %)

3.791

4.328

-26.479

42.410

Population Growth (Annual %)

1.608

1.032

-1.723

5.322

n=2916, 70 countries

8. Method
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Our sample consists of unbalanced panel data, where each country is
observed as a fixed unit annually and our dependent variable is a binary
categorical variable. All the independent variables are time-dependent variables.
To test our hypotheses, we used two modeling strategies. Because our dependent
variable is binary, we used logistic regression models. First, we built two sets of
logistic regression models using random effects. One set has only sovereign
defaults as the dependent variable and the other set has sovereign defaults and
“near” sovereign defaults as the dependent variable. Second, we built two sets of
logistic regression models using fixed effects with the same sets of dependent
variables. To build the logistic regression models, letting 𝜋!" be the probability of
a sovereign default by country i at time t, we set log

!!
!!!!

equal to a linear

function of 𝑥 variables, 𝛽𝑥! , where 𝛽𝑥!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑥!"! + ⋯ + 𝛽! 𝑥!"# . These models
allow for easy interpretation of the coefficients. With a simple transformation,
100 𝑒 ! − 1 , they can be interpreted as percent change in the odds caused by a 1unit increase in 𝑥 (Allison 1999).
We estimate logistic regression models with random effects,
𝑙𝑜𝑔

!!"
!!!!"

= 𝛽𝑥!" + 𝛼! ,

where 𝛼! is country-specific factors that do not vary over time. In other
words, these models assume that the errors based on the individual countries are
not correlated to specific years in the models and stay stable over the time period
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under consideration. These models report coefficients based on unit changes in
the individual country and not the entire population.
Table II - List of Countries in the Sample
Algeria*

Angola

Argentina*

Australia

Austria

Belgium

Bolivia*

Brazil*

Canada

Central African Republic*

Chile*

China

Colombia

Costa Rica*

Cote d’Ivoire*

Denmark

Dominican Republic*

Ecuador*

Egypt*

El Salvador

Finland

France

German Federal Republic

Germany

Ghana*

Greece

Guatemala*

Honduras*

Hungary

Iceland**

India*

Indonesia*

Ireland

Italy

Japan

Kenya*

Korea, Republic**

Malaysia

Mauritius

Mexico*

Morocco*

Myanmar*

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nicaragua*

Nigeria*

Norway

Panama*

Paraguay*

Peru*

Philippines*

Poland

Portugal

Romania*

Russian Federation*

Singapore

South Africa*

Spain

Sri Lanka*

Sweden

Switzerland

Thailand**

Tunisia*

Turkey*

United Kingdom

United States

Uruguay*

Venezuela*

Zambia*

Zimbabwe*

*countries that are included in the subsamples for Table V and VI, **countries that are included
in the subsample for Table VI.

We also estimate logistic regression models with fixed effects:
𝑙𝑜𝑔
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!!"
!!!!"

= 𝜇! + 𝛽𝑥!" + 𝛼! ,

where 𝛼! is a fixed constant that may be correlated with the time varying 𝑥.
Whereas random effects assume the unobserved factors stay stable over time, the
fixed-effects models assume the errors might be correlated with time. Fixedeffects models allow the correlation of omitted time-invariant explanatory
variables with measured explanatory variables, and therefore control for
unobserved heterogeneity. For our purposes, we expect these models to have a
better fit because we argue that default behavior might vary in certain periods
depending on the social conditions of the population. However, any variables that
do not vary across time or any countries that do not vary in the dependent
variable across time cannot be included in the analysis. Given that sovereign
defaults are relatively rare events, and even though we consider a long period of
time, only a smaller subset of the countries in the sample experience a sovereign
default. In these fixed effects models, we report results based on the smaller
subsets of countries that experience a sovereign default between 1962 and 2008
(Allison 2009).
We estimated the models using conditional maximum likelihood with
xtlogit command in STATA. For random effects models we used the re option and
for fixed effects we used the fe option . In order to control for reverse causation
all variables are lagged by 1 year.
9. Results
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Table II presents the correlation matrix. The Pearson correlations in this
matrix does not control for random or fixed effects. Tables III and IV present
logistic regression models with random effects. Finally, Table V and VI present
the results for the logistic regression models with fixed effects. Coefficients for all
the models are reported in the form of odds ratios for easier interpretation. Table
III and V report results using sovereign external defaults as the dependent
variable, which does not include any cases of “near” defaults. Tables IV and VI
consider cases of both defaults and “near” defaults.
Table III - Correlation Matrix of the Variables
Variable

1

2

3

4

External Sovereign Defaults

…

External Sovereign Defaults
and “Near” Defaults

0.965*

…

Cohesion in Trade for Defaults

-0.015

-0.016

Cohesion in Trade for Defaults
and “Near” Defaults

-0.015

Structural Equivalence in
Trade for Defaults

5

6

7

8

-0.016

1.000*

…

0.16*

0.151*

-0.046*

-0.046*

…

Structural Equivalence in
Trade for Defaults and “Near”
Defaults

0.16*

0.151*

-0.046*

-0.046*

1.000*

…

Polity2

-0.071*

-0.063*

0.073*

0.073*

-0.037*

-0.037*

…

GDP Growth (Annual %)

-0.109*

-0.104*

-0.027

-0.027

-0.095*

-0.095*

-0.159*

…

Population Growth (Annual %)

0.091*

0.088*

-0.089*

-0.089*

0.108*

0.108*

-0.518*

0.153*

n=1711, 38 countries ; *p<0.05

Our results lend some support for hypothesis 1 on cohesion among
borrowers or creditors. The dependent variable including “near” defaults were
built to capture potential cohesion effects that might happen across creditors that
could bail out a country before it technically declares sovereign default. In the
models excluding the cases of “near” defaults, cohesion did not reach
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significance. However, when the dependent variable included “near” defaults, the
models with fixed effects support hypothesis 1. This hints that the cohesion
processes plays a more important role amongst creditors compared to borrowers.
This supports the historical evidence of creditor associations appearing during
the time periods that experience high volumes of sovereign defaults
(Sturzenneger and Zettelmeyer, 2006).
The regression models lend strong support for hypothesis 2 on structural
equivalence regardless of the inclusion of “near” defaults in the dependent
variable. These results give credence to the argument that countries in similar
structural positions in the network of trade behave similarly.

Table IV - Coefficients as Odds Ratios from Random-Effects Logistic Regression
Models for Sovereign External Defaults as the Dependent Variable
Independent Variable

Model 1

Cohesion in Trade for Defaults

0.000
(0.000)

Structural Equivalence in
Trade for Defaults

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.000
(0.000)
1.12***
(0.028)

Model 5
0.000
(0.000)

1.092**
(0.029)

1.085**
(0.029)

Polity2

0.969
(0.019)

0.969
(0.019)

0.97
(0.019)

GDP Growth
(Annual %)

0.892***
(0.019)

0.904***
(0.019)

0.9***
(0.019)

Population Growth (Annual %)

1.649**
(0.252)

1.558**
(0.233)

1.557**
(0.231)

1.001
(0.011)

0.996
(0.011)

0.999
(0.011)

Year
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0.985
(0.008)

0.981
(0.009)

Constant

1.31x1011
(2.21x1012)

5.13x1014
(9.69x1015)

0.001
(0.019)

44.359
(0.897)

0.130
(2.863)

Observations

2916

2916

2916

2916

2916

No. of Countries

70

70

70

70

70

Lagged independent variables; panel-corrected SEs in parentheses; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01,
*p<0.05
Table V - Coefficients as Odds Ratios from Random Effects Logistic Regression
Models for Sovereign External Defaults and "Near" Defaults as the Dependent
Variable
Independent Variable

Model 6

Cohesion in Trade for
External Defaults and “Near”
Defaults

0.991
(0.035)

Structural Equivalence in
Trade for External Defaults
and “Near” Defaults

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

0.998
(0.033)
1.11***
(0.028)

Model 10
1.000
(0.033)

1.083**
(0.028)

1.086**
(0.028)

Polity2

0.973
(0.023)

0.974
(0.018)

0.974
(0.018)

GDP Growth (Annual %)

0.899***
(0.018)

0.907***
(0.019)

0.907***
(0.019)

Population Growth (Annual
%)

1.653**
(0.245)

1.568**
(0.224)

1.568**
(0.225)

Year

0.987
(0.008)

0.987
(0.009)

1.003
(0.013)

1.002
(0.011)

1.002
(0.011)

Constant

3.23x109
(5.29x1010)

2.85x109
(5.13x1010)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.006)

0.000
(0.006)

Observations

2916

2916

2916

2916

2916

No. of Countries

70

70

70

70

70

Lagged independent variables; panel-corrected SEs in parentheses; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01,
*p<0.05
Table VI - Coefficients as Odds Ratios from Fixed-Effects Logistic Regression
Models for Sovereign External Defaults as the Dependent Variable
Independent Variable

Model 11

Cohesion in Trade for Defaults

0
(0)

Structural Equivalence in Trade
for Defaults

Model 12

Model 13

Model 14

0
(0)
1.108***
(0.029)

Model 15
0
(0)

1.076*
(0.03)

1.071*
(0.03)

Polity2

0.971
(0.024)

0.978
(0.024)

0.978
(0.024)

GDP Growth (Annual %)

0.904***
(0.019)

0.913***
(0.02)

0.914***
(0.02)

Population Growth (Annual %)

1.491
(0.481)

1.223
(0.411)

1.218
(0.405)

1.004
(0.013)

0.995
(0.014)

0.997
(0.014)

Year
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0.99
(0.008)

0.986
(0.009)

Observations

1618

1618

1618

1618

1618

No. of Countries

36

36

36

36

36

Lagged independent variables; panel-corrected SEs in parentheses; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01,
*p<0.05
Table VII - Coefficients as Odds Ratios from Fixed Effects Logistic Regression
Models for Sovereign External Defaults and "Near" Defaults
Independent Variable

Model 16

Cohesion in Trade for
External Defaults and “Near”
Defaults

1.430*
(0.222)

Structural Equivalence in
Trade for External Defaults
and “Near” Defaults

Model 17

Model 18

Model 19

1.472*
(0.242)
1.094***
(0.028)

Model 20
1.484*
(0.246)

1.061*
(0.029)

1.063*
(0.03)

Polity2

0.971
(0.023)

0.978
(0.024)

0.977
(0.024)

GDP Growth (Annual %)

0.901***
(0.019)

0.911***
(0.02)

0.910***
(0.02)

Population Growth (Annual
%)

1.654
(0.532)

1.37
(0.443)

1.407
(0.468)

Year

0.991
(0.008)

0.992
(0.009)

1.009
(0.013)

1.004
(0.014)

1.004
(0.014)

Observations

1750

1750

1750

1750

1750

No. of Countries

39

39

39

39

39

Lagged independent variables; panel-corrected SEs in parentheses; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01,
*p<0.05

The magnitude of effects for both hypothesized variables are relatively
high in the models in which they are significant. In Table III, Model 5 includes
both hypothesized variables along with control variables for the logistic
regression model with random effects using only sovereign external defaults as
the dependent variable. This model provides no support for hypothesis 1 but
confirms hypothesis 2. Structural equivalence is statistically significant at the
p<0.01 level. For every unit increase in structural equivalence in trade the odds of
a sovereign default increase by 8.5%. This value corresponds to an increase of
13.9% in the odds ratio of sovereign defaults for every half standard deviation
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increase in the structural equivalence in trade score. In Table IV, the same
method is used for building the models but the dependent variable also includes
cases of “near” defaults. The results in model 10, which includes all variables, are
very similar, with a slightly higher coefficient. In this model, for every half
standard deviation increase in structural equivalence in trade the odds of a
sovereign default or a “near” sovereign default increases by 13.6%. Table V and VI
report on the results for the logistic regression models with fixed effects.
Hypothesis 2 is supported in all of these models as well. According to Model 15 in
Table V, for every half standard deviation increase in the structural equivalence
in trade score, the odds of a sovereign default increase by 11.6%. Table VI reports
on the dependent variable that includes both sovereign defaults and “near”
sovereign defaults. In Model 20, the magnitude is slightly lower at an increase of
10.4% in the odds of a sovereign default or a “near” sovereign default for every
half standard deviation increase in the structural equivalence in trade score. In
both models the variable is significant at p<0.05 level.
All of the results reported above confirm hypothesis 2. Models in Table VI
also show support for hypothesis 1. In Model 20, the trade cohesion score is
significant at p<0.05 level with a very high magnitude. For every half standard
deviation increase in the score the odds of a sovereign default or a “near”
sovereign default increase by 174%.
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Among the control variables, GDP growth is the only other variable that is
significant in all of our models. Population growth was significant in the models
using random effects but lost its statistical significance in the models using fixed
effects. Polity2 variable, which controls for democracy was not significant in any
of our models not supporting some of the previous literature.
10. Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to examine the effects of the position of
countries in global trade networks on their propensity to declare a sovereign
default. Using the perspectives of world-system, world-society, and institutional
theories, we argued that relationships through trade networks result in social
processes that can affect countries’ financial behavior. Specifically, we posit that
trade networks generate isomorphic pressures based on social cohesion and
structural equivalence.
The empirical results for structural equivalence in trade networks were
robust across the models. The empirical results regarding high volumes of trade
leading to cohesion among partners revealed a more complicated process. The
results hint that repeated interactions are significant when both default and
“near” default situations are considered. “Near” default situations are the cases
when the country gets bailed out by creditors or international organizations
before they declare sovereign default. When a close trade partner commits
sovereign default or finds itself in a “near” default situation, the focal country also
30

finds itself in a similar situation. The results suggest that creditors observing the
other partner might step in to rescue other countries they perceive to be in
similar situations. Nevertheless, policymakers seem to be affected by these
isomorphic pressures. While the existing literature displays a state-centered
focus and provides explanations through internal traits of countries, our analysis
stresses that in an increasingly global economy, where local economies are highly
connected and dependent on each other, countries are also affected by traits and
behavior of other countries. A country will not only be affected by changes in its
own economic and political variables, but also by the changes in other countries.
Recent analyses in sociology of finance have shown that changes in the
perception about depreciation of value for certain assets created a domino effect
of many other similarly positioned assets losing their value. The connectedness of
these assets through securities played a role in the great recession in 2008
(Fligstein and Goldstein 2011). Our findings reveal that changes of perception
might also happen due to changes in trade networks. Trade network measures
still reveal statistically significant results after controlling for GDP growth, which
is a robust indicator for sovereign defaults. This is important because changes in
trade networks might not necessarily be related to changes in the traits of local
economies or local debt in a country. Nevertheless, due to the sociallyconstructed nature of global finance, these changes can still lead to self-fulfilling
prophecies to a country’s default.
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Another interesting finding in our results is the lack of support for
democracy having a significant effect on sovereign defaults when trade network
position is controlled for. Previous theories have argued that democracy plays a
significant role because of the desire for maintaining political power by local
actors affect decision making regarding sovereign defaults (Verma 2002). Instead
we find that perceptions of a country by others might play a more important role
than the internal decision making.
One limitation of our study is that the sample includes only relatively large
economies. While they account for the vast majority of the global economy, many
small nation-states were left out due to lack of data, especially on trade networks.
Future research can perhaps compensate for this shortcoming through case
studies. Research on sovereign defaults can also turn to understanding their
consequences for economic growth and social stability over the medium and long
run. Economic sociology can add considerable insight to standard models of
political and economic development by emphasizing the embeddedness of
countries in global networks.
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ARTICLE 2: REVOLUTIONARY WAVES AND INTERNATIONAL
STRAINS: THE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL TRADE NETWORKS ON
REVOLUTIONARY SITUATIONS
1. Abstract
If revolutions result from state-breakdowns due to a combination of statecentered causal mechanisms, why do we also observe international diffusion of
revolutions in clusters across certain time periods? This paper analyzes the global
diffusion of revolutionary situations by embedding them in global economy and
world polity. I expect international strains to be distributed unevenly. Specifically
role equivalent or structural equivalent countries occupying a similar position in
the global trade networks, should be affected similarly and experience
revolutionary situations simultaneously. Countries with cohesion in trade should
also be affected similarly by international strains due to sharing high cultural
linkages. I build three measures of interconnectedness based on trade networks
and use data on revolutionary situations for 69 countries between 1962 and 2009
and test the hypotheses using logistic regression with random effects and with
country fixed effects. I find support for hypotheses based on global positions but
no statistical support is found for the hypothesis based on cohesion.
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2. Introduction
On December 18th, 2010, the overthrow of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of
Tunisia started a wave of uprisings that since came to be known as the “Arab
Spring.” Within eight months the governments were also overthrown in Egypt,
Yemen, and Libya, and protests spread to fifteen more countries. The Arab
Spring represents the most recent example in the phenomena of revolutionary
waves following the likes of the Atlantic revolutions at the end of 18th century, the
revolutions of 1848, and the revolutions of 1989. The phenomenon that
revolutions tend to cluster across time is well documented in the literature (Tilly
1996; Goldstone 2001; Beck 2011). It is also documented as an expectation of
revolutionaries, who believe others share their local causes against their relevant
states. This notion was apparent as early as 1906 when Trotsky was reflecting on
the 1905 first workers’ revolution in Russia in Results and Prospects (1906) when
he expected other parts of Europe to experience similar revolutions following the
Russian experience.
While revolutionary waves are a common observation, existing literature
finds that domestic factors play a highly significant role in leading to revolutions.
Accumulated research over decades concludes that state breakdowns lead to
revolutions. In other words, revolutions do not cause state-breakdowns, but
follow them. Therefore, the mechanisms leading to revolutions are closely related
to strains on the state structure. State-breakdowns tend to happen when a
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combination of mechanisms takes place simultaneously. Such interactions do not
frequently occur and this is one of the reasons why revolutions tend to be rare
events (Skocpol 1979; Goldstone 1991, 2001; Collins 1999; Goodwin 2001).
While the significance of international factors are generally recognized by
the theories of revolutions, there is not a common agreement on the degree of
their significance and how they affect revolutions. Studies stress the importance
of domestic variables, but not all of the research in the literature pays significant
attention to the international variables. Moreover, the research that considers the
international dimension can still have weaknesses due to leaving international
factors out of the causal analysis or creating an analytical bifurcation between the
domestic and international (Lawson 2015, Go 2014). This leads to a theoretical
puzzle in the literature given the observation of revolutionary waves: If
revolutions result from state-breakdowns due to a combination of state-centered
causal mechanisms, why do we also observe international diffusion of revolutions
in clusters across certain time periods?
This paper improves the existing literature by analyzing the embeddedness
of states in global economy and world polity. My analysis adds to the existing
literature in two ways. First, by accounting for all the multilateral relationships
between states across the period of investigation, I control for significant
relationships that might go unnoticed. Most research on revolutions relies on in
depth explanations of case studies, which provide robust explanations for the
40

causes in the particular cases under investigation. While such analyses allows the
researchers to account for domestic developments for the focal country and most
of the cross national relationships the focal country has with significant others in
great depth, it is not possible to account for all the developments in the
international developments in equal scrutiny. Moreover, it might be hard to
pinpoint significant international developments among the extremely great
number of international relationships that continue to change dynamically across
time. This is especially the case if the important relationship is one that does not
include the country in focus. For example, Lawson (2015) claims Haitian
Revolution in late 18th Century played a significant role by leaving a significant
legacy to provide world cultural scripts for later uprisings in the international
order. By analyzing the measures of interconnectedness based on all the
multilateral relationships of the countries in the population, I can account for
important relationships that might not appear as such in the a priori analysis, but
still keep the analysis on state level to study both domestic and international
strains simultaneously.
A second important contribution of this study to the literature on
revolutions is to control for multiple types of international strains simultaneously
to estimate their relative importance. Because of the aforementioned problems
regarding difficulties on in-depth analyses of cross-national processes, it is
difficult to study multiple types of international strains simultaneously. This has
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lead to reducing international strains to certain significant events, such as defeat
in war. In this paper, I develop three hypotheses derived from theories of
revolutions and global level world polity theory. The hypotheses are based on
previous works that find world-systemic openings, dependency, and world
cultural linkages to be significant international strains on the state structure. By
including the explanatory variables simultaneously in the models, comparison on
the magnitude and statistical significance of these effects can be made.
A more general contribution of this paper is to reveal that processes of
diffusion that were generally associated with business outcomes in economic
sociology and organization theory can also be observed for political crises of state.
This echoes recent collaborations in the social movements and organization
theory literature’s claims on the relatedness of the theories in the two fields
(Davis et al. 2005).
To test the hypothesis derived from research in state-centered theories of
revolutions, I build three measures of interconnectedness in trade networks for a
sample of 69 countries for the period between 1962 and 2009. These measures
focus on positions of countries in the global space across different relative
dimensions across time. Two of the measures focus on positioning in the global
trade and another measure focuses on the strength of trade ties between trade
partners. I argue that increased structural and role equivalence in the trade
networks will lead to similar fiscal strains in the state power. I also argue that
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trading in higher volumes with each other might lead to higher fiscal strains
when one of the cohesive partners experience a revolutionary situation.
Two sets of models logistic regression models are built for panel data, with
one set controlling for random effects and the other set controlling for fixed
effects. Both sets of models reveal similar results and support the hypotheses on
the significance of position in global trade networks. The hypothesis based on
cohesive partners is not supported.
3. Interstate Relationships and Revolutions
The importance of interstate relationships has long been recognized in the
theories of revolutions since the third generation of revolutionary theories since
Skocpol (1979)’s seminal work on revolutions stresses the importance of
transnational relationships in studying revolutions. Specifically, she argues that
world historical time and positions in the international arenas play a significant
role in causing revolutions. Improving on the mechanisms underlying
international processes, Collins (1999) identifies interstate power-prestige as a
significant factor in Geopolitical Theory. He argues that interstate powerprestige, which is closely affected by geopolitical conditions, is directly linked to
the legitimacy of rulers and ruling institutions. Significant loss of legitimacy by
the rulers is argued to potentially lead to revolutions. In these theories military
conflict is identified as the main international strain affecting revolutions.
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More recent research continues to signify international strains. Dependent
development and world-systemic openings are one of the necessary conditions
leading to revolutions in the Third World in Foran (2005)’s model. Potential
world-systemic openings occur when the status quo between core and periphery
states experience major developments. Perceptions of other countries on the
revolutions in the focal country are also important. International relations play a
significant role and revolutionary trajectories might change based on foreign
support or resistance (Goldstone 2014). The global position of foreign support or
resistance might also play an important role, as revolutionary intellectuals
supported by Great Powers might increase likeliness of successful revolutionary
outcomes (Kurzman 2008).
Despite the recognition of the international mechanisms and inclusion of
the global level in the models, Lawson (2015) argues that in analyses there is a
tendency to reduce international processes to limited number of factors; such as
Skocpol’s reduction of international conjecture to defeat in war, or to refrain from
including the international in the causal processes altogether. He reiterates Go
(2014)’s argument that this results to analytical bifurcation, possibly due to
methodological preferences. These criticisms point toward a gap in the research,
rather than fundamental problems in the existing research. As the preferred
methodology of research in revolutions is based on case studies, a common
strategy is to focus on a certain world historical time or geography. For example
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Skocpol (1979) explicitly stresses the importance of world historical time for the
particular international strains being incurred by the cases under review, but
makes an analyses based a frozen world historical time period. Foran (2005)’s
model limits the geography of the cases to third world countries and conditions
such as dependent development apply to the selected sample. This condition is
not necessarily contradicted by revolutions that take place in core countries. By
freezing the time period or focusing on a certain position in the global space,
researchers can focus on the causal factors that play a significant role in their
cases. This allows for building robust models for the relevant cases; however, also
results in limiting variance in the international developments.
Moreover, it should be recognized that holding positions or worldhistorical time constant allows the analyses to be fairly controlled against changes
in the bilateral relationships between third parties. For example, the
international Great Powers identified by Kurzman (2008) are significant actors in
the 1905-1915 period, but in other periods other states might replace them due to
relationships that take place without the focal states participation. As analyses
focusing on longer time periods or higher levels reveal, world hegemons change
over long centuries (Arrighi 2010). This does not necessarily contradict
Kurzman’s findings or create problem for his model, but points to places, where
we can improve our understanding of international processes.
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When the existing research in the literature is compared to each other, the
effects of international strains are observed as varying across different time
periods and different dimensions. For example, contrasted to Foran’s conclusion
that dependent development is a necessary condition for revolutions in third
world countries, Wallerstein (2011)’s argument that French Revolution in 1789
happened precisely because it was a country positioned in the core of the world
system might seem as two conflicting theories. Yet, in fact it reveals that
international strains are not evenly distributed across the global space and
dynamically vary across time and positions.
To improve upon the existing understanding of international effects on
revolutions, one should consider both dynamic changes in the international
strains across time and different positions while still accounting for domestic
strains. In order to capture these dynamic changes; one should also take into
account the international developments that take place without the participation
of the focal state. One promising way of achieving this goal is focusing on all the
bilateral relationships between the international actors by borrowing methods
and concepts from social network theory. As such, instead of limiting the focus to
only the relationships that include the focal state and significant others. Focusing
on multilateral relationships comprehensively can increase the power of analyses.
Taking these considerations in the account, three major inferences can be
derived from the existing models regarding the significant effects of international
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level strains. A commonly stressed international factor that plays an important
role in revolutionary theories is the global positioning. Whether treated as worldsystemic openings or placement relative to the international power structure,
global positioning is included in the models. As explained above, global positions
are not affected evenly across different positions or time. In order to analyze
dynamic changes in the global positioning, social network theory provides
valuable tools and methods. By focusing on the set of relationships between
actors, one can determine their positioning.
According to world system theories, the global positioning of a country is
determined by its trade relationships (Wallerstein [1974] 2011). To determine the
placement of the countries and their dynamic changes over time, one can utilize
Burt (1987)’s concept of structural equivalence. Structural equivalence is
determined by the sets of relationships that actors have with third parties. Two
actors are structurally equivalent if they possess the same sets of relationships
with the third party actors. Because world systemic position is mainly determined
by trade relationships, one can expect states with similar sets of trade
relationships to incur similar international strains, which might lead to
revolutionary situations. If two states are positioned similarly in the world
system, they are more likely to be influenced by similar world-system openings.
Thus, I predict that:
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Hypothesis 1: Controlling for domestic strains, the more
similarity between the sets of trade relationships of two countries are,
the more likely a revolutionary situation in one of them will be
followed by the other.

Sharing the same sets of relationships with third parties is one mechanism
that creates an equivalent position to identify states with a similar distribution of
international strains. Another type of equivalent position is due to sharing similar
types of relations. Role equivalence considers similarity in the types of
relationships carried out by actors in the network, as opposed to the similarity in
the sets of relationships. By considering the role equivalency of two states, one
can account for comparison across different populations (Winship and Mandel,
1984). Regarding the analyses of revolutionary situations, accounting for role
equivalence might play an important role in the cases, when states engage in
similar type of relationships across core and periphery but with varying
countries. For instance the International Powers might have a similar perception
on a certain type of states specializing in the trade of certain products. The
revolutionaries in these states might receive foreign support but the actual actors
sending the support might differ. This might be due to historical reasons or
territorial differences.
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For example Kurzman (2008) displays the importance of Great Powers in
the cases under investigation, but the Great Power making a significant effect is
not necessarily the same country for each case.
In such cases, when structural equivalency fails to capture these effects,
they can still be captured by role equivalence. Thus, following with the
arguments iterated above, one should expect the type of trade being engaged in to
have a significant affect in the distribution of international strains. Therefore, I
expect:
Hypothesis 2: Controlling for domestic strains, the more similar
the type of products traded by two countries are, the more likely a
revolutionary situation in one of them will be followed by the other.

Aside from global positioning, a second type of international causal factor
commonly identified in the literature on revolutions refers to the world cultural
linkages between countries. At the global level, Beck (2011) demonstrates
correlations between the expansion of world cultural linkages and revolutionary
waves even when controlled for hegemonic periods and hegemonic wars, which
do not reveal statistically significant coefficients in the models. He cites the
importance of global scripts distributed across the world society and argues that
the expansion of world cultural linkages play a significant role in revolutionary
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waves which are “events of an entire international system” and “cultural events”
(p. 193). At this level of analyses, how the international strains are distributed
internationally is not specified.
Analyses at lower level hints at why the distribution might be uneven.
Tarrow (2012) stresses the importance of transnational activists whose numbers
have increased over the years. He identifies this as “a diffusing phenomenon”
mainly from industrialized world to industrializing (187). Selbin (2010) stresses
the importance of available scripts at the individual level echoing Beck’s findings
at the global level and demonstrates the power of stories that can be adapted and
distributed by revolutionaries. He argues that the distribution happens based on
familiarity and states “(w)e like our stories familiar” (67), to explain that stories
result in mimesis not just due to mimicking or passive contagion, but through
active engagement of individuals, where they also strive to rise to the occasions
told by the stories. Stories of success from revolutionaries in other countries
might become inspirational.
Other work on world cultural linkages also reveal that diffusion processes
are not distributed across the globe evenly (Beckfield, 2010) and confirm that
diffusion of global processes are more likely to diffuse across cohesive trade
partners (Polillo and Guillén 2005; Henisz, Zelner and Guillén 2005). As such,
cohesive partners are those who trade in greater volumes with each and this is
akin to Selbin’s notion of familiarity at a higher level. Thus, if world cultural
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linkages are indeed increasing international strains upon the domestic state
structures, they are more likely to be distributed similarly among cohesive trade
partners. This could be due to mimesis happening through higher frequency of
relationships between actors through trade interactions. Thus, I predict that:
Hypothesis 3: Controlling for domestic strains, the more a state
trades with another country experiencing a revolutionary situation,
the more it is likely to have a revolutionary situation
4. Data
I have collected variables at the state-level from various international
time-series datasets to create panel data for 69 countries across six continents
between the years 1962 to 2009. The sample selection is based on Reinhart and
Rogoff’s collected sample and is representative of the global economy as it
represents 95% of the world GDP. Because the time period includes close to half a
century, not all the countries in the sample exist in each year of the investigation.
The countries, which do not exist or do not participate in international trade in
the beginning of the sample, are left censored until they become independent
states or start participating in international trade. The only country that is rightcensored in the dataset is German Federal Republic as it is treated as a separate
country from Germany after the unification. The mean GDP per capita of this
sample across all years is $7433 in Constant USD for the year 2000. Using this
sample, I have built trade network matrices for each year to calculate the
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explanatory measures. In the models that use fixed effects, variables that do not
vary in the dependent variable drop from the models. In other words, if a country
does not experience any revolutionary situation between 1962 and 2009 they are
dropped from the models. For this sample only 48 out of the 69 countries
experience at least one revolutionary situation between 1962 and 2009. The fixed
effects models report on this smaller sample. The mean GDP per capita for this
smaller sample is $3215. The significant difference between the means of the two
samples further support existing literature from both state-centered and world
systems theories that economic causes are significant in leading to revolutionary
situations.
While it would be more ideal to include a longer time frame with a larger
sample of countries, the sample is mainly restricted by data limitations. As it will
be detailed below, one of the explanatory variables is based on the Standardized
International Trade Codes, which were first reported by UN in 1962, disallowing
one to build the measure with as much detail and precision on the types of
relationships as required for the earlier years. While it would have been ideal to
include all the countries that participate in international trade, the quality of the
data decreases when countries with smaller populations or GDPs are added to the
sample.
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5. Dependent Variable
As discussed above, one of the key findings of state-centered theories of
revolutions is that state breakdowns are a pre-condition for revolutions. In other
words, revolutions do not break states but state breakdowns may lead to
revolutions (Goldstone 1993). Therefore, successful revolutions are the outcome
of a series of mechanisms that lead to increased strains on the state structure.
Thus, focusing at the state-level instead of a more macro level, such as
revolutionary waves is more informative. State-level analysis coupled with an
accounting for potential relationships also allows for identifying connections
between revolutions that might not appear immediately.
When the goal is to identify the significance of international strains in
revolutionary waves, considering revolutionary situations instead of successful
revolutionary results is more fitting. Limiting the analysis to only successful cases
might result in dropping some important cases from the analyses (Beck 2011).
For example, most recently, Arab Spring has affected an entire region but has
resulted in successful revolutions in only a fraction of the cases. This should not
necessarily be interpreted as unsuccessful cases not being affected by
international strains.. For this paper I follow Beck (2011)’s lead to separate
revolutionary onsets from revolutionary outcomes and focusing on the former
when studying the revolutionary waves. I will utilize the former for the dependent
variable.
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There is also another important reason for not limiting the dependent
variable to successful revolutions and focusing on the onset of revolutions
instead: Considering only the successful cases might undermine the international
effects of the whole revolutionary wave. World-Systemic openings or cultural
linkages might cause significant international strains, but might not interact with
other domestic strains. For example, the process of mimesis happening through
stories argued by Selbin (2010) does not need to be stories of successful
revolutions: they can also be about the promise of revolution. When multiple
countries are affected by world-systemic openings or cultural linkages but only a
handful of them experience successful revolutionary outcomes, it might be harder
to identify what type of international strain was significantly at play. Considering
all revolutionary onsets in the analyses might overcome this problem. Therefore,
for the analyses below, I control for revolutionary situations as the dependent
variable.
To build a dependent variable that accounts for whether a country
experiences a revolutionary situation in a given year or not, Revolutions
(domestic 7) variable was collected as the dependent variable from Banks’ CrossNational Time-Series Data Archive (Banks 2010), where events are defined as
“[a]ny illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a
change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is
independence from the central government.” Revolutions (domestic7) is a count
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variable that reports on the number of events for any given year at the state level.
For this sample, there are 524 cases of revolutionary situations experienced by 48
countries (Figure 1). I have then created a dummy variable based on the domestic
7 data to account for whether a country has experienced a revolutionary situation
in a given year or not1. This dummy variable, revolutionary situations, is utilized
as the dependent variable in the models.

Figure II - Revolutionary Situations Since 1963
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6. Explanatory Variable
Echoing the world-systemic and world cultural approaches, previous
literature analyzing global diffusion of processes, institutions, and practices have
identified trade network measures to play a significant role (Guler, Guillén, and
Macpherson 2002; Henisz, Zelner, and Guillén 2005; Polillo and Guillén 2005;
Weber, Davis, and Lounsbury 2009). Based on the lead of this line of work, I
have built structural equivalence in trade, role equivalence in trade, and cohesion
in trade measures to test the three hypotheses. The trade data for structural
equivalence and trade cohesion measure was collected from Correlates of War
(COW)2 Project Trade Data Set and the trade data with the required Standardized
International Trade Codes was collected from two separate sources. For the years
between 1962 and 2000, I used Feenstra et al. (2005)’s World Trade Flows: 19622000 Dataset. For the years between 2000 and 2009, I have relied on United
Nations COMTRADE Database. For the earlier years, the former dataset provides
a more reliable alternative to COMTRADE as the dataset includes multiple
sources including but not limited to UN COMTRADE. Three explanatory
variables are used for testing the international strains identified in the three
hypotheses.
The first hypothesis is tested by structural equivalence in trade variable. I
built this variable to account for the occupancy of similar positions in the trade
network. This measure relies on correlations of the sets of trade partners between
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two countries in a given year while also taking the volume of trade in each sets in
account. A hypothetical perfect correlation would happen if two countries were to
trade in the same volume of products with the same set of countries in a given
year. This measure increases for a country if it occupies a similar position with
other countries that experience a revolutionary situation in a given year. To
calculate the measure, first I built a separate symmetric bilateral trade matrix for
each year. Missing ties were coded as 0 and were treated as absent ties.
Imputation of missing bilateral trade values is problematic, especially for cases
regarding international conflict or sovereign crises (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins
2009). These bilateral trade matrices were used for both this measure and the
cohesion in trade measure. After the matrices were built, the correlation matrix
of trade partners for each country was calculated. Then, a vector of revolutionary
situations (𝑅𝑆!" ) for each year was created. These vectors, which were used in the
construction of each explanatory variable, were coded as the number of
revolutionary situations a country experienced in a given year and coded as 0 if
otherwise. Finally, the correlation matrices was multiplied by the RSjt
(Revolutionary Situations) vectors for the given year to attain the measure:
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡!" =

! 𝑅𝑆!" ×𝓇(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!" , 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!" ),

where i and j are the countries in a trade relationship and t is time.
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This score is not bounded and can be either positive or negative. The score
increases if a focal country is has higher structural equivalence with other
countries that experience a revolutionary situation. It also is susceptible to the
number of revolutionary situations in the given year. If structurally equivalent
countries are experiencing multiple revolutionary situations in the give year this
also adds to the score. According to hypothesis 1, structural equivalence in trade
effect is expected to have a significant effect with a positive magnitude on the
probability of a revolutionary situation taking place in a given year.
For the second hypothesis, I calculated a Role Equivalence for
Revolutionary Situations in Trade measure, which is adapted from the previously
used Role Equivalence in Trade measures in literature. This measure was initially
conceptualized by Winship and Mandel (1984) and later realized by Guler et al
(2002). It considers the similarities of the types of products that are traded by the
countries in the sample to account for the similarities in their trade structures.
This requires data on the types of product that are traded by each country in the
sample. The operationalization is carried out by utilizing The Standardized
International Trade Codes (SITC), which are reported by the United Nations
Statistics division. Since the implementation of SITC began only in 1962, this
measure cannot be built for earlier dates and limits the earliest date of data
available for the sample to 1962. The Standardized International Trade Codes go
from general to specific as the number of digits in a code increases. The single
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digit codes are the most general ones. The two digit codes are subgroups of single
digits and three digit codes are subgroups of two digit codes. For example, SITC 0
is “food and live animals.” SITC 01 is “meat and meat preparations.” SITC 011 is
“meat of bovine animals, fresh, chilled or frozen.” The measure is built using the
2-digit level codes, which are neither too specific nor too general.
To build the measure, I have collected the relevant SITC data from two
separate sources. For the years between 2000 and 2008, I have relied on United
Nations COMTRADE Database. For the years between 1962 and 2000, I used
Feenstra et al. (2005)’s World Trade Flows: 1962-2000 Dataset. For the earlier
years, Feenstra et al.’s dataset provides a more reliable alternative to
COMTRADE, as the dataset includes multiple sources including but not limited
to UN COMTRADE. The World Trade Flows: 1962-2000 Dataset only reports 4digit SITC codes, so to build the network measure, I have collapsed them into 2digit product categories. I have collected the data from UN COMTRADE at 2-digit
product level. Then I followed the procedure used by Polillo and Guillén (2005).
First I constructed an export product category share vector (EPSV) and an import
product category share vector (IPSV) for each country i and year t:
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑉!" =

!"#$%&'!"#

𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑉!" =

!"#$%&'!"#
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! !"#$%&'!"#

,

! !"#$%&'!"#

,

where 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠!"# is the value of exports in dollars for country i in year t for
product k, and 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠!"# is the value of imports in dollars for country i in year t
for product k. Then for each given year, I stacked these two vectors together, to
form a product category share vector, 𝑃𝑆𝑉!" . Finally, I calculated my measure of
role equivalence in trade with the following equation:
𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!" =

! 𝑅𝑆!"

× 𝑟(𝑃𝑆𝑉!" , 𝑃𝑆𝑉!" ),

where r is the Pearson correlation coefficient between product share
vectors, PSVs, for states i and j during year t; RS equals the number of
revolutionary situations state j has in year t. This score increases if the focal
state’s product share vector has a high correlation with revolutionary states’
product share vectors in a given year. If a state’s product share vectors are highly
positively correlated with states that experience revolutionary situations in a
given year, the score will increase. This score is not bounded and can also be
negative if the correlations between the types of products of two countries are
negative.
The objective in using this measure is creating a score based on a bimodal
social network. For a given year r(PSVit, PSVjt), creates a matrix that determines
the location of each country in the role equivalence in trade dimension of global
space. RSjt identifies the countries that experienced a revolutionary situation in
the given year. The score is then calculated upon a focal state’s distance to
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number of revolutions that took place in that given year. According to hypothesis
2, I expect role equivalence in trade to have a significant positive effect on the
number of revolutions in the focal state in a given year.
Finally, to test hypothesis 3, I have built cohesion in trade measure. This
measure considers the share of a focal country’s trade with another country so it
requires both bilateral trade data and total trade data, which COW Data Set
provides. The values in the trade matrices were then divided by the total trade in
each country to create a matrix that reports on share of a focal country’s trade
with another compared to its total trade. This new matrix was then multiplied
with the 𝑅𝑆!" vector for the given year as the following:

𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡!" =

!

𝑅𝑆!"

𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!"#
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!"

where, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!"# , refers to sum of bilateral trade between country i and j in
year t, and 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!" refers to the total trade country i engaged in with all other
countries in year t. As with the other measures, trade cohesion effect considers
the sum of a foal countries cohesion scores with all other countries that
experience a revolutionary situation in the give year. A country gets higher scores
if cohesive trade partners experience more number of revolutionary situations in
the given year. If a country has no cohesive partners experiencing a revolutionary
situation, then the score is 0. According to hypothesis 3, this measure should
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have a statistically significant effect with a positive magnitude on the dependent
variable.

7. Other Variables
To control for domestic strains, I introduce state-level controls identified
by Goldstone (1993) and build multivariate models. I have collected annual
population growth and annual GDP growth variables from World Development
Indicators (WDI) Dataset3. These variables report the percentage change from
the values in the previous year. In order to control for economic strain, I have
collected the crisis_tally variable from Reinhart and Rogoff’s Varieties Dataset
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2013). This dataset provides an exhaustive list of various
economic crises experienced by states between 1800 and 2010. The crisis_tally
variable is a count variable based upon the total count of banking crises, currency
crashes, sovereign domestic and external debt crises, inflation crises, or stock
market crashes a state has experienced in a given year. To control for
international warfare, I have collected the Interstate Major Episodes of Political
Violence (inttot) variable from Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2008
Dataset (Marshall, n.d.)4. This variable represents a magnitude score summed
from interstate violence and interstate war happening in a state. It excludes any
war or violence due to non-independent state or groups and is fitting to control
for international strains due to interstate wars. A time trend (calendar year) is
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also included in all the models. Table VIII lists the descriptive statistics of the
control variables along with the explanatory variables.

Table VIII - Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Revolutionary Situations
Revolutions (domestic7)
Structural Equivalence in Trade
Role Equivalence in Trade
Trade Cohesion
GDP Growth (Annual %)
Interstate Major Episodes of Violence (inttot)
Crisis Tally
Population Growth (Annual %)

Mean
0.154
0.186
6.408
3.551
0.586
3.865
0.052
0.937
1.618

SD
0.361
0.51
3.403
2.001
18.936
4.238
0.342
1.17
1.046

Min
0
0
-0.412
-0.074
0
-26.479
0
0
-4.529

Max
1
9
23.846
13.614
913.468
42.410
4
7
5.322

n=2821, 69 Countries

8. Method
The dependent variable is a binary categorical variable. This violates the
assumptions of homoscedasticity and uncorrelated error terms for ordinary least
squares regression. While Poisson regression is applicable for violation of these
assumptions, the dependent variable is also overdispersed, as its mean is not
equal to its variance. For such a dependent variable, logistic regression model fits
better (Allison 2009).
For 𝜋!" as the probability of a revolutionary situation by country 𝑖 at time 𝑡,
I built logistic regression models setting 𝑙𝑜𝑔

!!
!!!!

equal to linear function of 𝑥

variables, 𝛽𝑥! , where 𝛽𝑥!" = 𝛽𝑥! + 𝛽! 𝑥!"! + ⋯ + 𝛽! 𝑥!"# . Easy interpretation of
these coefficients as a percent change in the odds caused by a 1-unit increase in 𝑥
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is allowed by the transformation, 100 𝑒 ! − 1 (Allison 1999). I have built two sets
of models. The first one estimates logistic regression models with random effects,
𝑙𝑜𝑔

!!"
!!!!"

= 𝛽𝑥!" + 𝛼! ,

built by using xtlogit command with the re option. Here 𝛼! is countryspecific factors that do not vary over time. These models assume that errors
based on individual countries are stable over the time period of analysis. I also
built logistic regression models with fixed effects,
𝑙𝑜𝑔

!!"
!!!!"

= 𝜇! + 𝛽𝑥!" + 𝛼! ,

built by using xtlogit command in STATA with the fe option. Here 𝛼! may
be correlated with time varying 𝑥.
The former models are built with the assumption unobserved factors stay
stable over time and correct against inefficiency, whereas the latter models
correct against spuriousness by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
Controlling for the unobserved variables that do not change over time is valuable
when analyzing revolutionary waves, as many variables that are traditionally of
interest but hard to be observed can be accounted for. For example, in this
sample only independent states are considered, and as such, fixed effects allows
for controlling for whether a country has a colonial past or not. Similarly, using
fixed effects also controls for the geographies of the states that do not change over
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this period. While controlling for unobserved heterogeneity adds to the power of
the analyses, fixed effects models can only include variables that vary in the
group over the period of observation. This also applies to the dependent variable.
Therefore, introducing fixed effects results in the groups, which do not
experience a revolutionary situation in the period studied, to drop from the
analyses. After introducing the fixed effects, 48 countries remain in the models.
Random effects models are expected to fit better if 𝛼!" is not correlated
with the 𝑥. For the purposes of this paper, fixed effects models are likely to be a
better fit, as based on the literature, the effects due to global population is
expected to change over time. Nevertheless, the random effects models including
all the countries are reported first in the paper to check for any significant
changes in the results due to the loss a subset of countries with a significantly
higher GDP per capita average. In order to control for reverse causation all
variables are lagged by 1 year.
9. Results
Table X reports the correlation matrix of the variables for the sample. The
results in this table are the correlations before controls for panel data. Table XI
reports the results of the logistic regression models with random effects using
incidence rate ratios for easier interpretations. Finally, Table XII reports the
results of logistic regression models with fixed effects.
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The results reveal some support for hypothesis 1, strong support for
hypothesis 2, and no support for hypothesis 3. This seems to support theories
based on structural positions, compared to the hypotheses derived from world
cultural linkages arguments; however, some caution should be taken before
drawing strong conclusions, which will be discussed in the final section of the
paper.
Table IX - Countries in the Sample
Algeria*

Angola*

Argentina*

Australia

Austria

Belgium

Bolivia*

Brazil*

Canada

Central African Republic*

Chile*

China*

Colombia

Costa Rica

Cote d’Ivoire*

Denmark

Dominican Republic*

Ecuador*

Egypt*

El Salvador*

Finland

France

German Federal Republic*

Germany

Ghana*

Greece*

Guatemala*

Honduras*

Hungary*

India*

Indonesia*

Ireland

Italy*

Japan

Kenya*

Korea, Republic*

Malaysia*

Mauritius

Mexico*

Morocco*

Myanmar*

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nicaragua*

Nigeria*

Norway

Panama*

Paraguay*

Peru*

Philippines*

Poland

Portugal*

Romania*

Russian Federation*

Singapore

South Africa*

Spain*

Sri Lanka*

Sweden

Switzerland

Thailand*

Tunisia*

Turkey*

United Kingdom*

United States

Uruguay

Venezuela*

Zambia*

Zimbabwe*

*countries included in the models for Table XI
Table X - Pairwise Correlations
Variable
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1.Revolutionary Situations
2.Structural Equivalence in
Trade
3.Role Equivalence in Trade
4.Trade Cohesion
5.GDP Growth (Annual %)
6.Interstate Major Episodes
of Violence (inttot)
7.Crisis Tally
8.Population Growth
(Annual %)

…
0.217*

…

0.217*
-0.006
-0.081*
0.014

0.576*
-0.026
0.020
-0.073*

…
-0.013
0.076*
-0.062*

…
-0.018*
0.01

…
-0.003

…

0.130*
0.114*

0.194*
0.067*

0.126*
-0.153*

-0.008
-0.013

-0.260*
0.160*

-0.031
0.026

…
0.073*

n=2795, 69 countries; *p<0.05

The results of the models built with random effects are very similar to the
models built with fixed effects. For the explanatory variables, the statistical
significances are at the same level and the magnitudes of the variables are in the
same direction for each corresponding model. There are minute differences in the
strength of the magnitude in the models, but this is almost negligible. For the
control variables, there is some variance in the level of significances, but the
significant variables in first set of models are still significant in the second set of
models except the constant variable for the annual population growth. However,
the interaction variable for population growth is still significant in the fixed
effects models revealing a significant effect in the expected direction. This
similarity in the two sets of models, adds further confidence to the robustness of
the results. As the models with fixed effects are expected to be a better fit, only
the results of Table XI are interpreted below due to space constraints.
It is worth noting that Role Equivalence in Trade is statistically significant
at p<0.001 level in all of the models in which it is included and reveals results in
the expected direction. Contrary to the constant significance of Role Equivalence
in Trade, Trade Cohesion does not reach statistical significance in any of the
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models it is included in. Structural Equivalence in Trade is significant in all the
models that exclude Role Equivalence in Trade.

Table XI - Panel Random Effects Logistic Regression Models for Revolutionary
Situations
Variables
Structural
Equivalence in Trade
Role Equivalence in
Trade
Trade Cohesion

Model 1
1.091***
(0.020)

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4
1.082***
(0.021)

1.229***
(0.042)

Model 5

Model 6

1.209***
(0.042)

GDP Growth
(Annual %)

0.936***
(0.014)

0.939***
(0.014)

1.003
(0.004)
0.938***
(0.014)

Interstate Major
Episodes of Violence
(inttot)
Crisis Tally

1.587*
0.283

1.628**
(0.293)

1.544*
(0.274)

1.631**
(0.293)

1.045
(0.058)
3.651***
(1.311)
0.689***
(0.062)
1.001
(0.007)
0.007
(0.088)

1.059
(0.058)
3.583***
(1.287)
0.698***
(0.062)
0.995
(0.007)
345.886
(4811.055)

1.080
(0.059)
3.927***
(1.406)
0.675***
(0.060)
1.006
(0.007)
0.000
(0.000)

-963.866

-957.761

-972.391

1.055
(0.059)
3.566***
(1.283)
0.698***
(0.062)
0.995
(0.007)
283.535
(3946.963
)
-957.501

2821
69

2821
69

2821
69

2821
69

Population Growth
(Annual %)
[Population Growth
(Annual %)]2
Calendar year

1.003
(0.004)

Model 7
1.013
(0.027)
1.189***
(0.059)
1.002
(0.004)
0.939***
(0.014)

1.008
(0.005)
0.000
(0.000)

1.000
(0.005)
0.014
(0.146)

1.014
(0.005)
0.000
(0.000)

Log likelihood

-992.385

-985.073

n
Number of Countries

2821
69

2821
69

1003.372
2821
69

Constant

NOTE – Coefficients are reported as odds ratios; standard errors are reported in parentheses;
all independent variables are measured with a one-year lag; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Table XII - Panel Fixed Effects Logistic Regression Models for Revolutionary
Situations
Variables
Structural
Equivalence in Trade
Role Equivalence in
Trade
Trade Cohesion

Model 8
1.082***
(0.020)

Model 9

Model 10

Model 11
1.076***
(0.021)

1.228***
(0.042)

Model 12

Model 13

1.209***
(0.043)

GDP Growth
(Annual %)

0.938***
(0.014)

0.941***
(0.014)

1.061
(0.052)
0.941***
(0.014)

Interstate Major
Episodes of Violence
(inttot)
Crisis Tally

1.616**
0.287

1.661**
(0.297)

1.489*
(0.268)

1.582*
(0.288)

1.019
(0.056)

1.030
(0.057)

1.054
(0.057)

1.033
(0.057)
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1.057
(0.057)

Model 14
1.000
(0.027)
1.205***
(0.061)
1.052
(0.043)
0.942***
(0.014)

Population Growth
(Annual %)
[Population Growth
(Annual %)]2
Calendar year
Log likelihood
n
Number of Countries

1.009
(0.005)
-797.439
2035
48

1.000
(0.005)
-788.518
2035
48

1.014
(0.005)
-804.122
2035
48

2.090
(0.824)
0.689**
(0.062)
0.993
(0.007)
-769.653
2035
48

2.021
(0.792)
0.749**
(0.070)
0.987
(0.007)
-762.697
2035
48

2.223*
(0.874)
0.711***
(0.068)
0.995
(0.007)
-774.282
2035
48

1.982
(0.783)
0.739**
(0.070)
0.986
(0.007)
-760.336
2035
48

NOTE – Coefficients are reported as odds ratios; standard errors are reported in parentheses;
all independent variables are measured with a one-year lag; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

The first three models in Table XI are models built with only the
explanatory variable and a time trend. These models are followed by three
models that include a single explanatory variable with all the control variables.
The final model includes all variables. In Mode 8, Structural Equivalence in
Trade is highly statistically significant at p<0.001 level with a magnitude of 8.2%
increase in the odds of a revolutionary situation for every unit increase in the
measure. In Model 9, Role Equivalence in Trade is statistically significant at the
same level with a high magnitude of 22.8% in the odds of a revolutionary
situation for every unit increase in the measure. Model 10 reveals no statistical
significance for Trade Cohesion although its magnitude is in the expected
direction with a 5.7% increase in the odds of a revolutionary situation for every
unit increase in the measure.
Models 11, 12, and 13 introduce the control variables to the models.
Despite the introduction of the controls, the results do not deviate much from the
first three models. In Model 11, Structural Equivalence in Trade remains
statistically significant at p<0.001 level. Its magnitude diminishes slightly to an
increase of 7.6% in the odds of revolutionary situations for every unit increase in
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the measure. In Model 12, a similar observation can be made for Role
Equivalence in Trade with its statistical significance at p<0.001 level and a slight
drop of its magnitude to 20.9% increase in the odds of a revolutionary situation
for every unit increase in the measure. In Model 13, Trade Cohesion fails to reach
statistical significance again. In all these models, Annual GDP Growth, Interstate
Major Episodes of Violence, and Population Growth are statistically significant
and have magnitudes in the expected directions. Higher levels of annual GDP
growth have a negative impact in the odds of a revolutionary situation happening
in a given year. The effect is a 6.2% decrease in the odds of a revolutionary
situation for every percent increase of Annual GDP growth in a year for Model 11
and 5.9% decrease for Models 12 and 13. A unit increase in Interstate Major
Episodes of Violence increases the odds of a revolutionary situation by 61.6%,
66.1%, and 48.9% in the Models 11, 12, and 13 respectively. Population Growth
displays a u-shaped effect where lower values of population growth significantly
decrease the odds of a revolutionary situation, but higher values of population
growth significantly increases them. Crisis Tally is not statistically significant in
these models.
Finally, Model 14 controls for all the variables. Here, Structural
Equivalence in Trade loses its statistical significance and the magnitude drops to
a value that makes less than a 0.001% increase. Its confidence interval is between
a 5.2% decrease and a 5.6% increase in the odds of a revolutionary situation,
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stressing its failure to reach significance. Whereas, the Structural Equivalence in
Trade loses its magnitude in significance, Role Equivalence in Revolution reveals
a very similar result to Model 12 with reaching statistical significance again at the
level of p<0.001 and a magnitude of 20.5% increase in the odds of a
revolutionary situation for every unit increase in the measure. This variable has
the second highest level of significance in the model after Annual GDP Growth.
Its magnitude corresponds to an increase of 45.5% increase in the odds of a
revolutionary situation for every standard deviation increase in Role Equivalence
in Trade. Control variables display similar results in the final model with all of
them reaching statistical significance remaining statistically significant in the
same direction of magnitude. Crisis Tally fails to reach statistical significance in
this model as well.
10. Discussion and Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to investigate effects of international strains on
revolutionary situations. As recent reviews in the literature pointed out
international strains are not included in all the analysis of variations and when
they do they might not always be considered to have causal effects. This results in
a gap in the literature regarding the topography of international strains (Go 2014,
Lawson 2015). To diminish this gap, I have created measures of connectedness
across different dimensions of relationships related to trade in the global space.
Compared to previous research, which identify the revolutionary waves based on
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cultural connections, I have refrained from a priori identification of waves, but
instead applied tests o investigate linkages through these three dimensions of
trade. The three hypotheses were derived from existing research in the literature
of revolutions.
The results confirm the significance of international strains on revolutions.
Future research should continue to account for international strains and treat
them rigorously. Moreover, the models further point towards confirming a
common finding in the literature on the importance of global positioning. The
two hypotheses that revealed significant results in models were derived from
previous findings that suggested that the positioning in the world system play a
significant role. Out of the two measures testing the effects of global positions,
Role Equivalence in Trade has reached statistical significance at p<0.001 in all
levels and revealed a high magnitude all models. This hints that clusters of
revolutionary situations across time are highly clustered around countries that
share a similar role in global trade networks5. This is likely to be due to foreign
groups having a similar perception regarding role equivalent countries. However,
Structural Equivalence in Trade losing its significance when Role Equivalence is
introduced might be hinting another process, as it will be discussed below along
with hypothesis 3.
Although there was no confirmation for hypothesis 3, this does not
necessarily negate the previous findings regarding world cultural linkages. While
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these results reveal that there does not seem to be any process of cohesion or
normative mimesis happening among trade partners, other cultural linkages such
as religious networks or immigration networks might play a significant role in the
diffusion of revolutionary situations and future research should investigate them.
Other types of cultural networks should rigorously be studied in the future
research, especially the complication of results in Model 14, which hints that the
Structural Equivalence in Trade might be spurious. If indeed the real effect is
happening due to Role Equivalence and not Structural Equivalence, this might
also indicate a mimetic behavior.
Previously in the organizations literature, Role Equivalence in Trade has
been interpreted as a proxy for competitive mimicry and explained as a world
cultural process in economic sociology literature. While this explanation is fitting
for diffusion of practices and institutions, it does not fit as well for the case of
revolutions as competition among revolutionaries is unlikely. However, there
could be two alternative explanations based on this line of thought opposed to the
hypothesis derived above based on dependency arguments. One potential
explanation could be competition among states in the global markets resulting in
a zero-sum game for states specializing in certain type of products in certain time
periods. Therefore, by mimicking the behavior of their competitors, countries
might be experiencing higher strains eventually leading to revolutionary
situations in competitors. A second potential explanation could be due to the
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people of countries trading in similar products sharing a similar culture. The
people of a country specializing in agriculture might identify more with another
country’s fellow farmers. This might result in Selbin (2010)’s concept of mimesis
due to familiarity. Future research should focus on uncovering these effects.
As these results show, further scrutiny of global processes can significantly
increase our understandings of not only global processes, but also state
institutions. Previously, these measures of interconnectedness were used in
economic sociology and management literatures to test economic and business
related phenomena. This paper finds that these dimensions of trade networks
have significant effects beyond economic phenomena. Global networks also affect
political and social crises. These findings add more to the existing evidence of
embeddedness of markets in social processes.
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There were two main reasons for opting for a binary categorical variable as the dependent
variable. First, although they are not as rare as successful revolutionary outcomes, revolutionary
situations are still rare events. Most countries in the sample do not experience more than a single
revolutionary situation in a given year so a binary categorical variable is less susceptible to being
affected by outlier cases. Second, negative binomial models are not as easily controlled for
conditional fixed effects properly (Allison and Waterman 2002). Using a binary categorical
variable allows for building logistic regression models with conditional fixed effects. Negative
binomial models using domestic7 variable with random effects provided similar results to the
models with random effects presented in the paper.
1

Version 3.0 of the Bilateral Trade Dataset reported in dyadic trade relationships was used to
build the measures. Accessed on Jan 15, 2015. The data can be found online at
http://correlatesofwar.org.
2

World Development Indicators Dataset can be found online at http://data.worldbank.org/datacatalog/world-development-indicators I have relied on the STATA version compiled by Joseph N.
Cohen available at www.josephncohen.info Accessed on May 16, 2013
3

Goldstone argues for an interaction between domestic variables, however, the models that tested
for interactions between crisis_tally and inttot did not reveal any significant results. Because
revolutionary events are relatively rare, introducing too many problems might create problems
due to losing degrees of freedom. Due to the this reason and lack of statistical significance in
interaction terms, the interactions were dropped in the models reported.
4

Models controlling for Terms of Trade adjustment (constant LCU) (NYTTFGNFSKN) variable
from WDI neither changed the significance levels of any of the other variables nor revealed any
statistically significant effects of Terms of Trade. The coefficient displayed a 0% magnitude of
effect in the odds of revolutionary situations. This suggests role equivalence effect is happening
independent of global price changes. Models with this variable were not reported in the paper due
to introducing missing data problems (Number of observations in fixed effects models drops to
1805).
5
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ARTICLE 3: A THEORY OF STATE SECULARIZATION THROUGH
POST-REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL CONTENTION
1. Abstract
State Secularization is a process involving mobilization, political tactics, and
resources as opposing forces struggle over three major institutional dimensions.
Examining the history of state secularization in Turkey, Mexico, and France in
the aftermath of revolutions, this paper demonstrates that the degree of
secularization is determined by political contention. (1) The revolutionary state
attempts to seize church property, which opens the way for further struggles. (2)
If the church administers law through its own courts, or has an autonomous code
of law, revolutionary states struggle to substitute secular courts and state-enacted
law. (3) Churches often control education; a revolutionary state eventually
attempts to take control of education when it mobilizes sufficient resources for
the required state capacity. Taking all these dimensions together, the struggle
over secularization has many partial outcomes and stopping places, and thus
mixed patterns are much more typical than an ideal type transition to pure
secularist modernity.
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2. Introduction
In September 2011, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was the Prime Minister of
Turkey at the time, made his first visit to Egypt following the fall of Mobarak
regime and was greeted by signs that stated he was a “hero” and even “the Savior
of Islam and Saint of Allah.” Speaking to these fervent supporters, which were
composed mostly of Muslim Brotherhood supporters, Erdoğan declared “I
recommend a secular constitution to Egypt” (İdiz 2011; Vatan 2011). At first, this
might seem as a triumphant moment from a modernist perspective that expects
secularism as a historical terminus. Yet, during the same trip Erdoğan also stated
that secularism is not atheism and individuals cannot be secular. He stressed that
as an individual, he is a devout Muslim leading a secular state. For such a
perspective, an individual claiming to be both at the same time is contradictory.
In this paper, I argue that although they interact and affect each other,
secularism at state and individual level are different processes. I depart from
previous works that stress the importance of comparative studies that focus on a
higher level of analyses (Jacobsohn, 2003; Kuru 2009; Halikiopoulou 2011;
Dobbelaere 2002; Cady and Hurd 2010). Viewed in a historical and comparative
perspective, state secularization is the primary driving force of religion’s place in
social life; as it happens above all in revolutionary transformations. State
secularization is a struggle over the structural position on religious institutions.
This struggle is multi-sided and has a range of outcomes because it takes place
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along three different dimensions of political contention. Instead of assuming that
secularization is a terminal outcome, I problematize secularization itself, and
argue that it’s a reversible and continuous process. Instead of binary typologies of
secular and religious states, but I argue for differentiation on the degree of
secularism in the state institution at a given time.
Examining the history of the state secularization in Turkey, France, and
Mexico, I introduce three structural dimensions and demonstrate how the degree
of secularization in each is determined by political contention. The pattern of
these struggles can be generalized as the following: (1) The revolutionary state
attempts to seize church property. It's motivations may be to overcome
feudalism, solve government budget problems, or prevent counter-revolutionary
groups still loyal to the previous regime; in any case, attempting to seize church
property as a resource for mobilization is the first step. It creates an antagonism
between the new regime and the Church, and opens the way for further struggles.
(2) If the Church administers law through its own courts, or has an autonomous
code of law that the state must respect, revolutionary secularists struggle to
substitute secular courts and state-enacted law. This happens as secularists
attempt to legitimate their acts of resource mobilization. But revolutionary states
may also find it expedient to keep religious institutions as part of the state instead
of removing or delegitimizing them completely, because they can be used to
publicize revolutionary changes themselves. Rights of individuals and religious
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groups to practice religion in their own lives are formed in the context of these
political struggles over legal institutions. (3) Churches often control education,
especially elementary education; a revolutionary state eventually attempts to take
control of education as well, but this process is the most expensive and requires
the most state capacity; hence it comes later, and may involve substantial
compromises. Taking all these dimensions together, the struggle over
secularization has many partial outcomes and stopping places, and thus mixed
patterns are much more typical than an ideal type transition to pure secularist
modernity. Indeed, pure secularism in the form of the limitation of religion
entirely to private life cannot be taken as the default setting, but needs to be
explained by its own particular political circumstances.
3. The Ambiguity of Religious Secularization
Internationally comparative and historical analyses can be useful in filling
the gaps in literature regarding state secularization that has been criticized for
the dearth of comparative studies and paying uneven representation of the
United States of America, as about two thirds of all the articles published in the
top three sociology journals in the last three decades until 2007 has focused on
the USA. (Gorski and Altınordu 2008; Smilde and May 2010). United States has
a unique historical experience of formation of its state institutions and theories
from this unique trajectory might not always be applicable to other cases and
might even lead to operationalization problems in international surveys, when
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individuals might not be able to relate to the contexts being tested (Bender,
Cadge, Levitt, and Smilde 2013).
For studying state level secularization, comparative analysis has even more
insight, as focusing on one historical trajectory and potential counterfactuals has
less power of analysis compared to the information gathered from the variance
across multiple cases. Specifically, United States as a secular state that allows for
religious competition is far from being a universal model. As Centeno (2003: 18)
demonstrates focusing on western examples as the only theoretical models leads
to ignoring “contingency, contextuality, and relationality [which] play too
important a role in historical developments to allow for all encompassing general
laws, and certainly when these are based on faulty samples.” As it will be
discussed below, church property plays a significant role in the secularization of
states. Yet, the United States being founded with extremely limited church
property makes it a deviant case rather than the norm.
Comparative and historical analysis is also powerful for operationalizing
Chaves (1994: 750)’s definition of secularism “as the declining scope of religious
authority,” which directly refers to a dynamic process—“declining,” not declined.
In order to analyze how the declining scope of a particular institution,
comparison should be made not only with the trajectory of the institution across
time, but also its relation to others. These problems have been recognized in the
existing literature by either providing comparative cases within the religious
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space in United States or analyzing various forms of secularisms across the globe
(Smith 2003a; Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2008; Cady and Hurd 2010; Levey and
Modood 2009; Halikiopoulou, 2011; Kuru 2009). In this paper, I add to the
existing comparative research by focusing on the state formation periods and
identifying underlying mechanisms that lead to multiple forms of secularism. I
identify three historical cases of modern state formations in Turkey, Mexico, and
France, where the rate of secularism at state level significantly increases in the
aftermath of revolutions. While secularization has been suggested to be a process
of revolution as a matter of conflict between authorities before (Smith 2003b),
based on comparing the similarities in the processes experienced in the three
cases, I find that revolutions may lead to secularization processes by presenting
the political opportunities that allow opposing groups to significantly alter the
legitimating processes for the existence of a state. The challenger groups claiming
power to form the new state can legitimate the formation of the new state by
deferring to new forms and ideals that would have been entirely available in the
previous regimes. Specifically reforms of secularization or challenging religious
authority, cannot even be proposed in forms of state that are legitimated through
religious authority. Coupled with the necessity to mobilize resources, this leads to
distancing of the new state’s institutions from the old ones. When previous
regimes are tightly coupled with religious authorities, following revolutions
formations of new states happen through rapid secularization at state level.
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Despite their varying historical trajectories, geopolitical placement, and
dominant religious authority type, the historical experiences of France, Turkey,
and Mexico reveal common patterns during their secularization processes. Based
on these three cases, I argue that secularism of state structure is multidimensional and each dimension of secularism exists in degrees. I focus on the
mechanisms and patterns that lead to the rise of secular states to provide a macro
level theory that both sheds light on state structure, religious authority, and how
those relate to individual religiosity.
Analyzing how the scope of religious authority is defined through political
struggles across these identified dimensions allows for an in-depth analysis of
how secularization is stabilized at state level. I argue that contention over
distribution of resources acts as a fuse in the process of secularization over state
level. By establishing a monopoly over the definitions of sacred and mundane in
societies and power of rituals, religious authority maintains high ideological
power. In states with strong religious authority, this ideological power is used to
increase the material power of religious authority as well. This can happen
through donations from the devout, exemptions from state taxes, or even acting
as a trustworthy lending institution due to leveraging the status of being the
representative of a supreme being. Challengers to incumbent authority in the
state require mobilization of resources. When religious authority owns a
significant proportion of the resources in such cases, their ownership becomes an
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issue of contention. Because religious authority’s material power is heavily
supported by its ideological power, contention over religious property begins a
process over contention over religious authority’s scope over law, civic rights,
rituals, and eventually education. In order to maintain the ownership of their
resources and newly acquired power, challengers begin a process of acquiring
power in other dimensions to secure their position.
While these three dimensions are subjects of ongoing political contention,
they are fairly stable in established states. Property rights, makers and executors
of law, and the right to provide education are unlikely to go through major
changes. When they do, they are coupled with fundamental changes in the state
structure. I argue that secularization of the state is an ongoing political struggle
that can increase or decrease constantly. In other words, mechanisms of
secularization and de-secularization are always at work in conflict. However, the
rate of change under stable states is very slow and hard to analyze. For purposes
of easier analyses and demonstration of how the contention is fought, stateformation period provides fruitful examples. This is especially the case for the
states that are formed in the aftermath of a revolution, where religious authority
has a high scope over state affairs before the state breakdown. When highly
religious states face revolutions, the challengers attempting to establish a new
state require resources for their mobilization. In these cases religious property
and property protected under the religious authority is perceived as both threat
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and an opportunity for the challenger groups. Left in the hands of the religious
authority, these resources might be mobilized for counter-revolutionary
purposes. Revolutions provide political opportunities for confiscating the church
property. Confiscation of these resources not only weakens potential threats from
the previous regime, but also can be utilized for the resource mobilization needs
for the formation of a new state. In these cases secularization processes begin as a
by-product of resource mobilization for the new state. Thus, secularization
processes should not be explained solely as secularist ideologies resulting from
growing questioning of religious believes, but also be understood as a structural
mechanism arising due to the needs of a newly forming state, and they have the
potential to create ideal situations for state secularization.
4. “Unsettled lives” and Political Opportunities following Revolutions
The aftermath of revolutions provide rich evidence for significant swings
in the degree of secularism in the state structure. Cultural theories accept
institutions to be fairly stable due to removing uncertainty from situations
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991). The state with its constitution and laws is one of the
most stable type of institutions. The scope of religious authority in the state
structure is one of the core institutions in the state as it influences the state’s
ethos directly. Moreover, as Mische (2009) shows religious networks overlap
with activist and partisan networks and affect how political contention is shaped.
Because of the inertia of coded laws and constitution supported by pervasive
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networks at the micro and meso levels, change in the degree of secularization is
highly costly and takes place over a long period of time.
In order to make clear demonstrations, one needs to find cases where
there are significant changes in the degree of secularization in a state structure.
Such changes are unlikely to happen in stable states, as secularization requires
both structural and cultural changes within a state. As McAdam (1999)
demonstrates such political opportunities play a significant role in the beginning
of political processes. In the aftermath of revolutions challenger groups are not
only presented with such structural political opportunities to cease power; but
they can also find opportunities for striving for changes in the existing forms of
institutions and scripts. Swidler (1986: 273)’s concepts of culture as a “toolkit”
and dividing cultural periods into “settled” and “unsettled” provides a powerful
explanation for why this should be expected. Swidler assumes that culture
provides a “toolkit” of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct
“strategies of action.” She argues there are two distinct situations of “settled lives”
and “unsettled lives,” where culture is enacted differently. In “settled lives”
culture permeates into action and distinct analyses of the two are harder.
“Unsettled lives,” however, are “periods of social transformation” when
[e]stablished cultural ends are jettisoned with
apparent ease, and yet explicitly articulated cultural
models, such as ideologies, play a powerful role in
organizing social life… In such periods, ideologiesexplicit, articulated, highly organized meaning
systems (both political and religious)-establish new
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styles of strategies of action. When people are
learning new ways of organizing individual and
collective action, practicing unfamiliar habits until
they become familiar, then doctrine, symbol and
ritual directly shape action (278).
As state-centered theorists have long argued state-breakdown leads to
revolutions and not vice versa (Collins 1999; Goldstone 1993; Skocpol 1979).
While these theories argue that ideology is not a decisive cause of revolutions,
they accept that in its aftermath, ideology becomes significant for how society will
be reconstructed. As such, these periods create “unsettled lives,” when due to
increased uncertainty about established legitimacy; individuals rely on explicit
stated scripts such as ideologies to guide their actions. Because there is no
commonly agreed upon “settled” culture at these periods, they serve as ideal
periods for political opportunities to use challenging ideologies to frame in
opposition to previously dominant ones.
With regards to secularization processes, they require changes not only in
the institutional and legal norms but also in the process of legitimizing the
carried out actions. Thus, secularization at state level requires both structural and
cultural reforms. The breakdowns of states with high scope of religious authority
result in such “unsettled” periods and provide “political opportunities” for
secularism to be a legitimating ideology in political contention for challenger
groups. While under “settled” periods, it might be highly costly to challenge
established authority due to being both legally and culturally disallowed, such as
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being blasphemous and illegal, during “unsettled lives” they might become less
costly. As the scope of religious authority in a state is tightly coupled with the
very institutions that form the structure of a state, historical cases of statebreakdowns serve as great examples for studying such “unsettled” periods. Thus,
it is expected to find significant changes to the degree of secularism in state
structure following revolutions, especially in cases when the previous state is
tightly coupled with a religious or secularist authority. It is, then, not surprising
to find that certain revolutions might instigate political contention by secularists
against religious authority. Such cases are seen following the breakdowns of
states in Turkish, Mexican, and French Revolutions (Table XII).
Table XIII - Three Cases of State Secularization
Country
Turkey

Dominant Religion
Islam

Church Property
Nationalization of all
religious property
with the abolition of
Caliphate (March
1924)

France

Catholic Church

Confiscation of all
church property after
the Great Revolution
(1789)

Mexico

Catholic Church

First major
confiscation attempts
with limited success
in mid 19th century
(1859 – act on
nationalization of
church property).
Property ownership of
church banned by
1917 constitution.
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Law and Civic Rights
Implementation of
secular laws (1926),
Religion removed from
constitution(1928),
ongoing regulation of
people’s religious
activities in daily lives
through reforms
(beginning 1925),
secularism coded into
constitution (1937)
Secularizing reforms and
regulation of religious
activities following the
revolution (1789-1801).
Secularization reforms
begin again in the Third
republic after 1880.
Secularism coded into
constitution in 1905.
Secularization reforms in
mid 19th century. Anticlerical and anti religious
constitution of 1917 goes
in effect following
revolution in 1910.
Secularization and close
scrutiny over religious
authority 1917-1929.

Education
Education brought
under education
ministry (1924). Major
education campaigns in
1930s.

Institutional legal
changes following the
Great Revolution (17941795). Ferry Laws
secularizing education
with educational
campaigns (18791886).
Deportation of
educators from
religious clergy to
provide education only
from secular educators
(1924).

5. Secularizing Revolutions in Turkey, Mexico, and France
All three cases witness such revolutions when pre-revolutionary regime is
closely identified with the religious authority. Of the three cases the Turkish case
reveals the most rapid undertaking of the reforms across the three dimensions
with a concerted effort in the first 20 years following the declaration of the
Republic. This happens partly because it happens later than the other cases and
the rule makers of the new state have learned from the previous experiences of
secularization. Here, the Turkish case is presented first, as it involves a more
continuous increase in the rate of the secularization of its state in the period
analyzed1.
At the end of world war during the revolutionary period when a dual
sovereignty situation arises in the Ottoman Empire, both groups making a claim
for the sovereign state identify state and religious authority in unison. Specifically
the revolutionary parliament in Ankara is opened with the goal of saving the
Sultan and the Caliphate (Akgun 1985). The Emperor of Ottoman Empire also
held the title of Caliphate of Islam leaning on legitimating the state authority
through religious justification (Deringil 1991) Similarly, in France before the
Great Revolution in 1789, monarchy was closely connected to the Catholic
Church. Since the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, Roman Catholic
Church had monopoly over religious domain in France. The Church had
established economic independence and had exercised sovereignty upon its own
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institution. Furthermore, the Church had authority over non-religious domains
as it exercised nearly complete authority over education, provided public
assistance and healthcare, held registers over births, deaths, and marriages,
provided employment, and had the power of censorship. In the last 15 years
before the revolution, about 90% of the bishops belonged to the nobility (Lewy
1974). Following the First Federal Republic of Mexico in 1824, Catholic religion
was seen as one of the three pillars of Mexico, where the Church enjoyed greater
wealth than the state and held special privileges (fueros) (Bazant 1991).
In each three cases, the fall of empires through revolutions begins a
process of secularization of state, which results in the scope of religious authority
significantly diminishing in the institutions of the new states. Turkey and France
had secularism coded into their constitution (Kuru 2009). Mexican has
significantly limited the rights of church and civic rights of clergy and until the
recent constitutional reforms in 1992 it could be described as “a secular
anticlerical state, with anti-religious traits” (Reyes, 2010: 511). The length of the
process varied across the three cases. In France and Mexico, it was spread over a
century but in Turkey it took about two decades. Yet in all three cases, these
contentions take place across three dimensions: (1) religious property, (2) law
and civic rights, (3) education.
These dimensions of contention are experienced in the stated order
although they can overlap. The issue of property is fought over first and the
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outcome of how the material resources are distributed among religious and
secularist groups become path-dependent in the secularization process of the
state structure. As social movements literature informs, resource mobilization
plays an important role in successful social movements. Opposed to the previous
regime, in the post-revolutionary period the newly forming nation-state require
material resources to compete for power. Since the ancién-regime gains its
legitimacy through religious authority, revolutions allow the challenger groups to
confiscate the wealth of not only the previous regime but also the closely tied
religious authority. This might happen not only by revoking the monetary
privileges of the religious authority, but also through confiscating religious
property. The process begins with limiting the scope of religious authority on
property because the act is used for mobilizing the resources for future political
contentions. This act not only creates resource mobilization, but it also literally
takes away the resources of religious authority and their supporters for the future
contentions. The contention across the other dimensions can only succeed for the
secularist groups after significantly limiting the scope of religious authority on
property rights. Successful resource mobilization through antagonizing the
religious authority leads to political contention across law and civic rights.
Contention across this dimension happens to legitimate the new resources of
state and gather support from the masses.
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The law dimension is the contention for legitimacy of secularist ideologies
at the macro level. Issues of whether to define a state religion or not, writing the
constitution, criminal and civil codes, and whether they should be beholden to
religious authority are decided through political struggles between the two
groups. Secularist groups attempt to limit the scope of religious authority in law
by forming secular judiciary and removing clergy from administration of law.
They also attempt to secularize daily life by removing religion from public
activities. The dimension of civic rights is the process of legitimation in the micro
level. During the contentious period, both secularist and religious groups
compete for dominance in society. They attempt to regulate public life through
regulations and rituals. In the extreme periods of contention they might revoke
certain civic rights entirely through declaring martial law.
The dimension of education begins in later stages as it is intended to
trickle down the process to future generations and stabilize it. Secularizing
education begins after there has been significant process in secularizing law and
civic rights. This is because when the right of secular education is illegal, political
opportunities for contention do not exist. The rate of secularism in the structure
of state is determined by how contentions across these three dimensions are
resolved.
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6. Political Struggle over Church Property
Political contention over church property plays a key role in secularization
processes. In states, where religious authority has a high scope, they maintain
high ideological power (Mann 1986), but their scope is not limited to the
ideological sphere. In absolute monarchies and pre-modern states, they also
possess great material power by owning resources and holding privileges. The
Ottoman Empire was based on the principle of forming religious war against the
infidels and has been structured by its gaza principle throughout its existence
(Inalcik [1994] 1997). In 1789 France, the Church had 10-15% of all the property
in its possession, yet only paid 2% of taxes collected by the state due to waivers
(Sargent and Velde 1995). In Mexico, after the independence, Catholic Church
was the richest institution (Matson 1979). Economic resources play a large role in
maintaining religious authorities’ wide scope. Material power plays a key role in
defeating rivals in social conflict and opposing parties strive to attain greater
material power all the time (Collins 2012). Thus, secularization processes are
unlikely to succeed against a religious authority that attains both great material
and ideological power.
When these states broke down, the challengers forming the new state
began to expropriate the material resources of the previous regime. Because the
material resources of the previous regime were equated with religious authority,
this led to enacting secularist ideologies. In order to distance oneself from the
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ancién-regime, religious ideologies were also alienated. Thus, the blasphemous
idea of stealing God’s property, was legitimated through the nation claiming its
rights. As this happened, the newly forming states not only increased their
material resources, but also diminished the material resources of their main
oppositions. In all three cases, the secularization processes began with
appropriation of the material power belonging to the religious authority. Due to
the radical nature of the act, it took place during a revolutionary period or war
time, when there was imminent physical conflict.
In Turkey, the parliament of the newly formed republic could confiscate
church property rapidly. This was mostly due to the economic and political
weaknesses of the Ottoman State in the 19th and early 20th century. Following the
sovereign default in 1875, the Ottoman State had given up part of its sovereignty
to collect revenues to the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, which was
overseen by European representatives (Eldem 2005). The heavy defeat in World
War I and invasion of allied forces on the Ottoman Land led to a revolutionary
period with double sovereignty. While the Sultanate continued its claim in
Istanbul, a rival parliament convened in Ankara to save the Sultanate and the
Caliphate (Akgün 1985). For the revolutionary government in Ankara, the
weakness of the Ottoman State’s sovereignty represented a political opportunity.
The parliament in Ankara assumed the taxation rights of the Istanbul rule and
blocked Istanbul’s trade resources. They also exercised sovereignty over any land
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that they won back from the allied invaders (Müderrisoğlu [1997] 2007).
Following the end of independence war and declaration of peace with the Entente
Powers, the parliament separated the institution of Caliphate from the Sultanate.
As the last Ottoman Emperor Mehmed VI fled the country, a new Caliph was
elected by the parliament. By separating the two entities, the parliament
attempted to revoke the religious authority’s sovereignty over the public treasury.
Yet, the demands of Caliphate, which included having a share of the public
budget that asked ten times the amount allotted for the presidential office, led to
the parliament’s abolishing of the position. With the abolishing of the Caliphate
all the religious treasuries and waqfs—properties guaranteed under protection of
religious authority—were also nationalized. Once the law regarding the Caliphate
was passed, confiscation was perceived as a natural act (Akgün 1985).
In France, the financial crisis, which played a significant role in leading to
the breakdown of Ancien Régime, also created the political opportunity to light
the fuse for the secularization process. The process was similar, as the
nationalization of the church property was one of the first acts of the
revolutionaries. The August 4th Decrees issued in 1789 abolished all tithes
including those collected by the Church (Dwyer and McPhee 2002). The first
anticlerical act of the revolutionary government began with nationalizing
religious property, as they issued the decree on the confiscation of Church
property on November 2, 1789 about 3 months after the declaration of the Rights
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of Man. The decree nationalized all Church property and promised minimum
salaries for the clergy. This decree was the first of a series of decrees that would
be issued in the next six years regarding the issues of secularization of state.
Other decrees that would follow would focus on the rights of citizens to freely
choose their religion, and describing the duties and allegiances of the existing
clergy. The revolutionaries would also bring reforms to mundane activities in the
daily life to decouple them from religious connotations such as the
implementation of a new calendar, but it is worth noting that the secularization
process began first with the issue of religious property. Moreover, most of these
rapid secularization attempts were reversed at the end of the highly contentious
revolutionary period when Napoleon assumed power, but the religious property
that was confiscated during the Revolutionary period was not returned. When
Napoleon signed the Concordat with the Holy See, Vatican accepted the
legitimacy of the confiscations and ownership of the purchasers in Article 13,
which states “His Holiness, in the interest of peace and happy reestablishment of
the Catholic religion, declares that neither he nor his successors will trouble in
any manner the purchasers of alienated ecclesiastical property, and that, in
consequence, the ownership of these same properties, and the rights and
revenues attached to them, shall rest unchallenged in their hands or in those of
their assigns” (Maclear 1995: 97). The confiscation of the Church property and
removal of tithes collected by the Church was part of the economic reforms
carried out by the revolutionaries to overcome the economic crisis, but this has
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also resulted in the secular state securing its position against the religious
authority by significantly crippling its resources for mobilization.
In Mexico, following the declaration of independence in 1821, the Church
was “the richest single corporation in the country” (Costeloe 1967: 2). The
independence was followed by turmoil and ongoing conflict both within the
Mexican State and with international powers. While both liberal and conservative
governments made multiple attempts to confiscate church property to finance the
weak state budget, they were unsuccessful until the reform period beginning with
Lerdo Law in 1856. In this initial period following the independence, the Church
not only owned great amounts of real estate, but also had successfully turned its
ideological power into a material one through acting as the only lending bank in
Mexico. The perennial existence of Church had been transformed into trust for
investors. In the early years, high government debt and lack of funds in the state
did not provide sufficient legitimacy for those in power to simply confiscate
church property to raise revenues. Existing resource mobilization of the Church
thwarted such attempts. The confiscation of the Church property only became
possible when there is an “unsettled period” due to a rebellion, for which the
Church could be blamed. This was the beginning of the reform period with the
Lerdo Law of 1856. While the reform in the next three decades removed the
position of the Church as the dominant bank and confiscated about two thirds of
its property, the Church maintained its wealth through 1870s recovering through
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donations of the wealthy supporters (Bazant 2008; Costeloe 1967). In the
Mexican case, the failure of rapid and complete confiscation of religious property
by the anticlerical groups had spillover effects on how the political contention
fared in the other dimensions. The Church, which managed to find new channels
of income after losing its role as the national bank and losing its property,
remained as a formidable opponent against the anticlerical groups. Following the
Mexican Revolution, the Church was still perceived as a threat by the anticlerical
groups, which resulted in the Church losing its legal status in Mexico and being
banned from property ownership after the 1917 constitution (Reyes 2010). Unlike
the Turkish and French cases; however, the religious authority’s resources
allowed for armed resistance against the secular reforms; which resulted in a 3
year long civil war in the country between 1926 and 1929.
7. Political Struggle over Religious Law and Civic Rights
The second dimension of political struggle over secularization happens
over law and civic rights. This dimension has direct effects on the daily lives of
individuals, as it is contention over defining how the state should regulate the
behavior over individuals. It determines the limits of religious authority’s
regulation over citizens as well as secular authority’s regulation over religious
authority. With the resources mobilized through limiting religious authority, the
secularizing groups attempt to legitimate their state structure through shaping
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the law accordingly. The amount of resources mobilized from curbing religious
property has an affect on the degree of contention and the results.
In Turkey, the rapid nationalization of all religious property to the modern
state allowed for the secularist groups to implement legal changes with relatively
weak political opposition after the end of the War of Independence and
declaration of the Republic in 1923. Yet, as mentioned above, the economy of the
Ottoman Empire before the World War I was weak and despite the
nationalization of all the property that belonged to the religious authority and the
Sultanate, the existing resources for the infrastructure of the country was limited.
This led to the Turkish secularization groups co-opting the religious property and
religious networks completely, instead of abolishing them. While the parliament
was initially founded to save the Caliphate and the Sultanate, as stated above
(Akgün 1985), the constitution of the parliament described the administrative
order and the mission of the parliament during wartime did not specify any
religion; however, its seventh article stated that the right of the execution of
Sharia Law belonged to the parliament. Thus, initially the revolutionary
parliament was founded on the premise of both saving and administrating the
religious authority. However, after the War of Independence following the
invasion of allied forces at the end of World War I was won, in November 1922,
the Sultanate was deemed illegal. The institution of Caliphate was separated from
Sultanate was brought under the power of parliament, which would elect the
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Caliphs. When the republic was declared on October 29th, 1923, the constitution
was revised to include that the religion of Turkish State was Islam while still
keeping the article about administrating Sharia Law (Kili, 1980).
In March 1924, the Caliphate was abolished, as it was perceived as a
significant political rival by the parliament. The same day Sharia Courts were also
removed (Akgün 1985). The Caliphate was replaced with the Islamic Directorate,
which served under the office of the prime minister as a tool for legitimating the
secular state, government, and parliament. It could issue religious fatwas in
accordance with the ideologies of the parliament, as well as issuing sermon
scripts for Friday prayers to the imams of the mosques, who were employed and
inspected by the directorate. These early legal changes transformed the legal
structure of state from one, where the secular parliament was bound to the
religious authority, to a new legal framework, where the religious authority was
bound to secular authority. However, due to internal struggles within the
parliament, the new constitution that the parliament set into place in 1924 still
defined Islam as the religion of the state (Kili, 1980). In 1926, new civil and
criminal codes were introduced, which were both adapted from European
counterparts. In 1928, a defined religion was removed from the constitution.
These changes made citizens legally responsible against the authority of secular
state, instead of the religious authority.
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While these legal changes defined the state structure, reforms were also
introduced to secularize the behavior of citizens in their daily lives. In late 1925,
the hat and clothing revolution was imposed, which required men to wear a
European hat. It brought strict controls over the representation of self in public
and attempted to eliminate traditional clothing emblems, which were also
imbued with religious connotations, and replace them with what were perceived
as “modern” ones. These reforms also banned religious clergy from wearing their
religious clothing in public. The Islamic Directorate collaborated with the
government’s efforts in spreading the reforms. Regulation of the clothing of the
religious authority diminished their status in public sphere. Many of the religious
officials also had other economic affairs and their religious clothing would help
them in their daily affairs. Removal of religious symbols from public space
disallowed them from using their religious status in non-religious transactions,
which became problematic for them. At the end of 1925, international time and
calendar was adopted. In 1934, surname law was imposed, which standardized
people’s names instead of relying on their statuses in public (Kili, 1980). In 1935,
weekend was changed into Sundays instead of Fridays as a holiday on which
communal Friday prayers also took place (Yılmaz 2013). Finally in 1937, the
secularism of Turkish State was coded into its constitution.
The legal reforms that were carried out in the two decades that followed
World War I, represents a unique case of rapid legal secularization. A state with a
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constitutionally defined religion, whose laws were executed through religious
authority, and a public life, which revolved around time units, weekdays and
calendar years set around religious ritual, was transformed into a constitutionally
secular state with a secular public outlook. Through legal secularization, the new
secular state was able to not only curb the scope of religious authority but also
subdue its opponents.
While the Turkish experience demonstrates as an extremely rapid case,
where revolutionaries introduce rapid reforms after entirely co-opting both
material and ideological resources of the established religious authority,
similarities can be found in the French and Mexican cases. The French case
reveals that the process of secularization is not linear and can be reversible in
both directions. While there was a period of rapid secularization following the
1789 Revolution, religious authority partly recovered its power during the
periods, when the Republic fell and the Empire was reestablished. France
eventually became a constitutionally secular state through the lengthy politically
contentious period across both the legal/civic rights and education dimensions in
the Third Republic from 1871 onwards.
Following the 1789 Revolution, the August 4th Decrees abolished the
feudal system and every citizen was allowed to hold any ecclesiastic, civilian, or
military positions. The Declaration of Human Rights issued in the same month
placed state law above all. About a year later in July 1790, a Decree on the Civil
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Constitution of Clergy was issued, which described the structure of the Church,
its election processes, and its relationship with the Pope, disallowing clergy to ask
the Pope for any confirmation. The decree also included Article 21, which
stipulated that clergy must declare their allegiance to the nation before the
consecration ceremony. About three months later in November the decree on
Clerical Oath was issued, which required all the clergy to swear to be faithful to
the nation and its law (Maclear 1995).
While legal changes were made to remove religious authority at the level of
state structure, in the period of radical struggle in 1793-94, Robespierre also
attempted to drastically change the daily lives of individuals through attempting
to impose a new religion of supreme being. This attempt included changing the
perception of calendar time through imposing 10-day weeks to decouple the
calendar from religion as well as introducing the new metric measurement
system. Marriage was changed into civil law and became a contract, rather than
an oath made under divine law (Sewell 1985). Not all of these reforms lasted long.
The radical social transformation following the revolution brought about the
reign of Terror alongside; which was succeeded by Napoleonic rule. Napoleon
followed less anti-clerical politics and signed Concordat with the Pope. The
concordat restored the oaths but still allowed the practice of religions other than
Catholicism within France. Following the Napoleonic Rule, King Louis XVIII
restored the Church in 1815.
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In the Third Republic, which was declared in 1871 after a war defeat by
Prussia, political contentions over secularization fired up again. In March 1880,
decrees against unauthorized religious congregations were issued. In July 1880, a
law was passed that removed the obligatory Sunday rest. In July 1884, divorces
were deemed legal again and public prayers were banned. Government measures
were taken against religious teaching orders in 1901. France finally became
constitutionally secular in 1905, about a century after the series of revolutions
began in 1789. While the secularization process parallels the Turkish case by
carrying out reforms both on the legal framework and daily activities, the French
case should make us recognize that secularization is not a unidirectional process
and that reversals of direction are possible everywhere, driven by the dynamics of
political contention.
The first constitution of Mexico in 1824 stated that “[t]he religion of the
Mexican nation is and shall be perpetually the Catholic, Apostolic, Roman
religion. The nation protects it with wise and just laws and prohibits the exercise
of any other” (Bazant 1991: 9). During the reform period in mid 19th century,
beginning with constitution of 1857, a series of reform laws were passed to limit
the scope of religious authority including the implementation of freedom of
religion and civil marriages. The reforms and amendments made to the
constitution in 1873 and 1874 introduced the principle of “separation between the
Church and the State” to the constitution (Reyes, 2010: 509). Following the
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revolution in 1910, the new constitution in 1917 had articles for regulating
religious worship and banning clergy from criticizing the state. In 1926, President
Calles increased the pressure on clergy by passing a law that made religious
offenses to be prosecuted as criminal cases. This was responded to, first by the
clergy going on strike, then by the Cristeros Civil War between 1926-1929.
As the legal changes experienced in the three cases above reveal, the legal
dimension of secularization plays a role in both legitimizing secularism and
affecting people’s daily lives. Religious people are left with no choice but to live
according to secularist conventions if they choose to continue to participate in
public space. Otherwise going into public with banned religious garments or
other emblems can result in them being removed from the public space through
incarceration or even execution.
8. Political Struggle over Religious Education
As the legal and civic rights changes that increase secularization
disseminate through the public, secularization across education dimension
begins. Similar to the pattern in the previous dimension discussed above,
education is initially secularized legally earlier on, but practical implementation
takes a longer time period. Another common pattern across the education
dimension is that secularization initially begins at more advanced levels. In
Turkey, education was united under a single curriculum with the Tevhid-i
Tedrisat Law on the same day that the Caliphate was removed on March 3rd,
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1924. With this law, the medreses, which served as religious advanced level
schools were also shut down and transformed into secular universities. While this
initial reform was carried out early on, the real thrust towards educational reform
began in 1928 following the removal of religion from the constitution. The state
focused on increasing literacy rates among the public while also educating them
on a common national identity. This began in 1928 with the introduction of the
new Turkish Alphabet based on the Latin Alphabet. This was followed by the
opening of National Schools (Millet Mektepleri) at the end of the same year
(Yılmaz 2013). These schools aimed at teaching the new letters to the citizens of
all ages. Turkish History Institution and Turkish Language Institutions were
founded in 1931 and 1932 respectively, to further the secular education. The
foundation of Turkish Language Institute gave the start for “the Language
Revolution,” which attempted to create a secular nation that all speaks the
modern Turkish language. While these attempts were not very successful due to
limited resources and lack of finances, meanwhile the number of primary schools
and students enrolled were increased (Cumhuriyet Arşivi, n.d.). In the Turkish
case one main obstacle against increasing the number of students enrolled were
the lack of educated secular teachers, who could be appointed. This served as one
reason to why more advanced levels of schooling were secularized first.
In France, the revolutionaries’ Constitution of 1793 included provisions for
universal education; however, it did not come to be enacted due to lack of
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resources. Despite the decree in November 1794 stressing the idea of universal
education, a year later the decree issued in October 1795, made education
optional again. Hampson ([1963]1995) states that at this period the main concern
was on the écoles centrales, which provided secondary education in each
Department. These schools would not be accessible to those with only primary
education. These early stages echo the Turkish case and the Tevhid-i Tedrisat
law. In both cases the legal framework on education changed, but enactment was
left for later stages due to lack of resources. In the initial stages attention was
paid to education at more advanced levels in both cases because these advanced
levels served the more immediate needs of the secularists. In the Turkish case,
those educated in foreign universities were brought into high positions in the
state to lead departments. Also focusing on advanced education disproportionally
benefits the classes that support the secularist cause. In the case of France, the
écoles centrales mostly benefited the bourgeoisie.
Unlike the Turkish case, the French case was a lengthy process of state
secularization that spread across a century. While the confiscation of religious
property was rapidly achieved in the beginning, the law and civic rights
dimension spread over century with swings between republics and monarchies.
The major political contention over universal secular education took place in the
Third Republic, when the Ferry Laws were introduced by a reforming Minister of
Education between 1879 and 1886. The law on June 16, 1881 established public
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education. The enactment of the law of October 30th, 1886 removed clergy from
primary schools. This law provided a 5-year transition period for male schools,
during which those with religious memberships would have to be replaced.
Female schools did not have any such limits, but required that nuns were to be
replaced by secular teachers in new teaching positions due to retirements, death
or reassignments (Lehning 2001). The urgency for secularizing primary schools
for males was related to the fact that this was a period of heavy debates and
political struggles over universal manhood suffrage.
In Mexico, contention over secular education was heavily affected by the
power of the Church throughout the 19th Century and carried onto the 20th
Century. Because of the existence of a strong Church backed by material
resources, the educational secularization went through progress and reversals.
During the reform period in mid-19th Century, attempts were made at removing
the Church’s control over education; however, by the end of century during the
Porfirian period, the Church’s support to President Porfirio Diaz allowed them to
be dominant in educational institutions again. After the revolution, The Church
faced a serious backlash, as it suffered from being identified with the Porfirian
regime. The constitution of 1917 banned religious education completely. Though
Mexican State and the Church collaborated briefly again in 1920-1924 due to lack
of state resources to provide secular education, once President Calles assumed
power in 1924, a highly anticlerical program began, which included enforcing the
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constitutional ban on religious education as well as deporting foreign clergy, most
of which were educators. These rulings along with the harsher rulings discussed
above in the law and civic rights dimension, resulted in the civil war, which ended
in an accord that would not allow any religious education in state schools, but
give freedom to the Church to provide religious education in church property
(Espinoza 2015).
The dimension of education gets implemented in the later stages of
secularization, because its purpose is achieving stability and longevity for the
status quo. It also serves to further legitimate the secularist structure of the state,
through inculcating future generations with the secularist ideology.
9. Conclusion: The Sequence of Secularizing Institutional Changes
Secularization of the state is not a binary concept. While coding
secularization into the constitution of the state might represent a significant
capstone, the rates of secularization vary across different dimensions. As these
cases show, patterns depend on how the contention is fought among different
parties. Confiscation of church property happens early in the formation of the
revolutionary state and lights the fuse of the secularization process. The amount
of existing church property and the rate of confiscation have lasting effects on the
other dimensions. In the Turkish case the dearth of religious property or other
wealth from the previous regime results in the secularist state co-opting the
ideological and network power of the religious authority, rather than entirely
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weakening it. Compared to the French case, where attempts are made to remove
or reduce the number of clergy, Turkish State creates an Islamic directorate to
dictate the type of religious sermon that supports the secular state. While the
secular state diminishes the scope of religious authority, they do not aim to
remove it entirely.
For the periods discussed, all cases carry out reforms that affect both legal
codes to transform the state structure and public practices to transform
individual’s daily behavior. Not only is defined religion removed from state
constitution, other practices are dictated upon citizens to decouple their behavior
and habits from religious authority. These include, but are not limited to,
acceptable clothing in public, freedom of speech, and even perception of calendar
time. Such changes make secularization of state a mandatory act to be accepted
by citizens, rather than something to be opted in (Yılmaz 2013). For example in
the Turkish and Mexican cases, if religious authorities want to appear in public
places, they must remove their religious clothing, otherwise they are severely
punished.
In the later stages of state secularization, the permeation of secularist
values among the public is further achieved through education. Education is not
only used for crafting literate individuals that can be valued members of the work
force but also for imbuing the secularist ideas of the state. This is why both who
gets to teach the students and what is taught to them becomes major issues of
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contention. Because secularist groups start at a disadvantage compared to clergy
in terms of not having established schools in these cases, the secularization of
schools begin at the university level at first. This is both due to a lack of
secularist, non-clergy teachers to fill in vacant positions in the mass elementary
schools, and to the budget problem for funding such schools. In later stages,
attempts are made to secularize primary education.
These dimensions also play an important role in the reversal of
secularization processes. Over the last decade, the share of Islamic Directorate
funds in the Turkish government’s budget has more than doubled. In 2001, the
year before Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (JDP) came into
power the share of Islamic Directorate in the budget was 0.50%. After gradually
increasing its share every year, in 2012 it received 1.12% of the government’s
budget (BUMKO n.d.). The increase in the financial resources of the Islamic
Directorate was coupled with increases in the scope of its authority, such as a law
in 2010 allowing Islamic Directorate to ban web sites that provide false
information on Islam. These developments were followed by educational reforms
increasing the number of religious teachings in elementary schools.
The theory presented here is intended to provide the tools for
understanding the process of secularization beyond these particular cases and
also for cases, where secularization is reversed. The argument here also stresses
that the United States can be a misleading case to take as the archetype of the
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secularization process generally. If the three main processes are a sequence of
struggles over church property, religious courts and laws, and religious
education, only the last of these has much importance in the United States.
Church property, which plays a key role in igniting secularization processes, did
not have a significant presence in colonial America. Similarly, the American
states did not have to struggle over a Church monopoly over administration of
law. Thus the secularizing process in the United States of America began from a
relatively small scope of religious authority. The main issues of state
secularization were already disposed of by the time the United States began, and
it was these rather unusual historical circumstances that led to the vigorous
religious competition studied extensively by the religious markets literature
(Finke and Stark 1992).
As these historical cases reveal, secularization cannot properly be analyzed
when it is assumed to be a terminal outcome. It is only through problematizing
secular states, can one understand the mechanisms leading to them. As these
cases show, neither religious authority nor secular authority is static. Instead, the
scopes of both authorities vary and can increase or decrease across time. These
changes happen through political contentions of opposing groups. As one group
gains more power, they determine the scope of religious authority. An
explanatory theory of state secularization must be a theory of the mobilization,
political tactics and resources of opposing forces, as they struggle over the
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institutional dimensions that constitute different amounts and kinds of religious
secularization. This in turn means that increasing religiosity at state level will
also involve struggle across these dimensions and successful mobilization of
property or resources available by the Church in secular states are likely to bring
political contentions across institutional dimensions of law and education in
secular states.
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The data presented on the Turkish case is based on the references as well as extensive
archival research in the State Archives of the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey in
Ankara and the parliamentary proceedings archives available online in the official
website of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey [http://www.tbmm.gov.tr]
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CONCLUSION
The articles presented in this dissertation reveal that while crises of
sovereignty occur rarely, they are not random. Even though they might be
perceived as unexpected and surprising by bystanders, systematic analysis finds
that crises do not happen in isolation, on the contrary, they are patterned by the
global developments.
Study of the trade networks reveals that diffusion of different types of
crises across the world are significantly affected by the trade relationships that
countries have with each other. The difficulty for identifying these patterns is due
to the highly complex and dynamic structure of global trade. Methods
implementing big data and machine learning used in articles 1 and 2 reveal that
when used in complementary to the theories derived from the existing
sociological literature, these methods can be highly beneficial in furthering our
understanding of sociological phenomena. I find that there is a pattern to global
diffusion of crises, but more importantly the two articles reveal that this pattern
is not unique for a certain type of crises, but is seen across various types of
unrelated crises. This is important for recognizing that countries do not randomly
get affected by a wave of crises, and one can explain why certain countries stay
afloat while others sink.
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The third article studies the aftermath of crises in depth and finds patterns
to how this global diffusion might be patterned. The findings show that
secularization of a state is patterned across three major dimensions and the
struggles between the religious authority and political authority across these
dimensions determine the type of secularity that is enforced in a state. The
findings of this paper motivate potential studies that might explain the recent
developments that are experienced by present-day Turkey, as struggles between
religious and secular authority still play a certain role in political and social
crises.
When looking at a stable regime between secular and religious authorities,
one should pay specific attention to (1) property rights of the religious authority,
(2) civic rights and legal rights in relation to religious groups, and (3) the
educational system. If significant changes are happening in any of these
dimensions, it should be expected that the political struggles between the
religious and secular authorities in the state will increase and will likely create
instability and potential political and social crises in that state until the struggles
across these dimensions are ended and a new status quo is reached.
Future studies should also focus on the implementation of machine
learning and big data on the aftermath of crises. The recent developments in
machine learning allows researchers to implement natural language processing
and topic modeling on large corpus of data. Given the online archives provided by
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states, it is possible to gather data on early parliamentary hearings following
revolutions. Implementing topic modeling on this data should allow for
researchers to be able to verify the patterns that are found in this research from a
quantitative perspective. Using these methods one can even increase the amount
of cases included in future studies. The machine learning techniques are not
limited by the number of languages that a researcher can command; therefore,
they allow for future research to compare the aftermaths of revolutions even
when they result in entirely different forms of state structures.
It is no doubt that just a few years from now, the data used in this research
will be perceived as relatively small data. Every year more granular and
comprehensive data becomes available for the researchers. As documents are
digitized and more data becomes available to researchers, it will be impossible for
sociologists to ignore it. Yet, they will only add to the explanatory power of
sociology. Separating valuable data from noise will only be possible if strong
theories can be provided by researchers. Given the strong tradition and value of
contributions provided by sociologists from the fields of revolutionary theory,
social movements, and economic sociology, there is no doubt that the muchneeded theorizing for big data will come from these fields.
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